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This thesis analyzes the impact of the Critical
Technologies Plan (CTP) on planning and budgeting activities
associated with weapons systems Test and Evaluation (T&E). It
discusses the intent and purpose of the CTP. It develops the
role and functional areas of T&E. Lastly, it analyzes the
relationship between the objectives and processes involved in
weapon systems T&E and the purpose of the CTP.
The CTP is deemed to have a significant impact on T&E.
Thirteen out of 20 critical technologies are concluded to be
capable of making major contributions in 11 of the 13 T&E
functional areas.
It is recommended that personnel from the Deputy
Director, Defense Research and Engineering (Test and
Evaluation) be placed on the working group responsible for
developing the CTP. Further, it is recommended that the T&E
community view the CTP not only as a method of anticipating
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I.INTRODUCTION
This introduction provides the background and objectives
for this thesis. It includes a list of research questions
answered throughout the description and analysis. The scope,
limitations and assumptions made during the formulation of the
framework is described. The next section discusses the
methodology employed during the collection and analysis of
data. Finally, the organization of this thesis is provided.
A. BACKGROUND
Growing challenges to U.S. dominance of fields such as
computing, superconductivity, and semiconductor manufacturing
have led some in Congress to advocate a more aggressive role
in spurring developmental technologies. This opinion was
reaffirmed in a recent report from the Senate Armed Services
Committee:
The recent dramatic events in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union only reinforce thf need for a comprehensive
science and technology policy.
Because U.S. defense depends upon state of the art
technology, and DoD funds a significant share of total U.S.
1 Senate Armed Services Committee, Acquisition Policy and
Management Report, 1990 p. 179.
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support for research and development, DoD technology policy
can be seen as both part of the problem and solution.
Public Law 100-456, and subsequent legislation requiring
the DoD to submit an annual Critical Technologies Plan (CTP)
for identifying and developing technologies, is one important
response to this problem. These technologies are to be those
which are critical to the superiority of American weapon
systems.
Another approach to insuring the superiority of weapon
systems is Test and Evaluation (T&E). The fundamental purpose
of T&E is to identify the areas of risk to be reduced or
eliminated. Test and evaluation is conducted to demonstrate
and determine the feasibility of conceptual approaches, to
minimize design risk, to identify design alternatives, to
compare and analyze tradeoffs, and to estimate operational
effectiveness and suitability.
B. OBJECTIVES
This thesis explores these two aspects (CTP and T&E) of
weapon systems development and discusses their potential
inter-relationship. It discusses the relationship between the
objectives and processes involved in test and evaluation of
weapon systems and the purpose of the Critical Technologies
Plan. It analyzes the impact of the CTP on planning and
budgeting activities associated with weapons systems test and
evaluation. Finally, it suggests inputs which the T&E
2
community might provide to future Critical Technology Plans
and the manner in which T&E planners might benefit from the
CTP approach.
Legislation requires the Secretary of Defense to submit an
annual plan for identifying and developing technologies
critical to the Department of Defense (DoD). The CTP is a new
approach to allocating research and development resources
within DoD. Two reports have been completed, and there is
reason to believe that the new requirements associated with
CTP may continue and, in fact, be expanded in the foreseeable
future. Therefore the T&E community should understand what it
may mean for them and how they might impact the CTP. Few have
thought about the CTP from this perspective. Because the
implementation of the CTP is still in the formative stages, it
is possible to have some impact.
C. RESEARCH QUESTION
1. Primary Research Question
What are the major impacts on weapons systems testing
and evaluation (T&E) of the requirement for a Department of
Defense Critical Technologies Plan (CTP)?
2. Subsidiary Research Questions
What is the CTP?
What is the legislative origin and intent of the
statute which established the CTP?
What are the legal requirements?
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What did the 1989 and 1990 CTPs encompass?
What are the purposes and processes of testing weapons
systems?
Why is testing important?
What are its contributions to national security?
What are the major categories of testing?
What technological resources are needed to evaluate
weapons systems?
What are the purposes and processes of evaluating
weapons systems?
Why is evaluation significant?
What are its contributions to national security?
What are the major categories of evaluation?
What technological resources are needed to evaluate
weapons systems?
How might the CTP influence T&E?
What are the potential advantages, from a T&E
perspective, of the CTP and the goals it seeks to achieve?
Given the requirements for weapons systems testing,
what inputs to the CTP would the T&E community recommend?
What might the T&E community learn from the CTP?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSU1PTIONS
1. Scope
This thesis is divided into four sections. These
sections include an examination of the CTP, the role of T&E,
4
potential impacts of the CTP on T&E, and recommendations and
conclusions.
First, the purpose of the CTP is discussed. Specific
issues consider the problem it addresses, how it intends to
solve this problem, and its requirements for DoD.
Additionally, a description of the two CTPs which DoD has
completed is included in Appendix D. However, insight is
limited because this is a new and very demanding requirement,
and implementation is still in a formative stage. Gaining
information about implementation was difficult for this same
reason.
Second, the role of T&E - its processes, purposes,
importance and major categories is described. The question
of how T&E initiates new technology into weapon systems is
emphasized. Potential impacts of the CTP on T&E is
highlighted in the third section. This includes the manner in
which T&E needs and processes might be factored into the CTP
process.
Finally, the analysis generated some recommendations
regarding the manner in which the CTP process might be
improved to address T&E requirements. It also suggests how the
T&E community might take advantage of the CTP process.
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2. Limitations and Assumptions
a. General Limitation
This thesis is not advocating that advanced
technology is the only method in which the T&E community
should further its capability. A systems engineering approach
is appropriate for designing new T&E systems. Reliability,
maintainability, availability, supportabilty, manability,
cost, and schedule should be considered when designing and
procuring the system. Advanced technology is only one factor
in maintaining the capability of T&E systems.
b. Test and Evaluation Functions
In Chapter III, where the functions needed to
perform T&E are developed, a generic test facility is
analyzed. Individual facilities within the Major Range and
Test Facility Base (MTRFB) may have specialized needs.
Therefore, the T&E functions identified and used to evaluate
the impact of the CTP may not apply or cover all activities at
individual facilities.
Also, it is assumed that proper pre-test planning
has occurred in identifying the T&E functions. The discussion
focuses on technologies needed to perform T&E. Therefore, the




Data was gathered through interviews with officials at
White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), NM and the Pacific Missile
Test Center (PMTC), Point Mugu, CA. The Technical Director was
interviewed at White Sands. Other interviews conducted at WSMR
included personnel from the Army Materiel Test and Evaluation
Directorate, National Range Operations Directorate and Nuclear
Effects Directorate. The Assistant Executive Director and
personnel from the Weapons Evaluation Directorate were
interviewed at PMTC. Strategic plans and mission statements
were also used to describe the technological requirements of
the T&E community.
Review of congressional testimony and discussion with a
congressional staff member provided background and insight
into the CTP. Personnel from the Office of Deputy of Defense
Research and Advanced Technology and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs) were also
interviewed. In addition, a professor of T&E Management, and
supervisor personnel at the Defense Systems Management College
contributed.
Current articles from defense policy journals, statutory
law, committee reports and testimony, documents related to
legislative intent, DoD T&E management guides and the two CTPs
were used for background and analysis. This documentation is
referenced in the bibliography.
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A bibliography search was conducted through the Defense
Logistics Studies Information Exchange. Further literature
research was conducted through the Dudley Knox library at the
Naval Postgraduate School and Defense Systems Management
College.
Data analysis consisted of consolidating information and
analyzing it in accordance with the framework described here.
General public policy analysis techniques and management
concepts aided in developing the relationship between the CTP
and T&E. The author's personal work experience and contacts in
the T&E community were used to assess the technological needs
of the T&E community.
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
1. Introduction
The introduction identifies the purpose and scope of
the thesis. It includes the reasons for the study and a
general description of the study.
2. Critical Technologies Plan
The background and the requirement for the CTP is
explored. Insight to its legal requirements and legislative
intent for DoD is provided. Congressional responses to the
first two plans are examined.
'. Test and Evaluation
This chapter discusses the process, purpose,
importance and major categories of T&E. The discussion
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includes technology policy issues involving integration of new
technology, resources, costs, and operational performance.
4. Impact of Critical Technologies Plan on Test and
Evaluation
A discussion of the relationship between the CTP and
weapons systems test and evaluation is presented. This
relationship was found through analysis and interpretation of
the facts and opinions coming from the research literature and
interviews. Interpretation also relies on the author's
personal T&E experiences and contacts within the T&E
community.
5. Recommendations and Conclusions
This discussion focuses on what the CTP might mean to
the T&E community, its impact and how the technological needs
of the T&E community can be furthered within the framework of
the CTP.
6. Appendices A, B, and C
These appendices contain reproductions of the 1988,
1989 and 1990 legislation requiring the submittal of the CTP.
7. Appendix D
This appendix summarizes the 1989 and 1990 CTPs. The
differences between the two plans are identified and
discussed.
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II. CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES PLAN
This chapter describes the two Critical Technologies Plans
(CTPs) submitted by the Department of Defense (DoD) to
Congress. It starts with a discussion of the origination and
legislative intent of the Critical Technologies Plan (CTP).
The origination section deals with the events leading up to
the initial requirement for a joint DoD and Department of
Energy (DOE) CTP. The legislative intent portion attempts to
examine the purpose of the CTP. Subsequently, the legal
requirements, planning process, selected critical
technologies, and reactions to the 1989 and 1990 CTPs are
addressed. In the segment on selected technologies in the 1990
plan, a discussion of the prioritizing process is included.
Lastly, the 1991 anticipated legislation is reviewed.
A. ORIGINATION
The Subcommittee on Defense Industry and Technology of the
Senate Armed Services Committee has the responsibility for
ensuring that the United States technology and industrial base
remains strong to support the national security strategy. In
the spring of 1988 the subcommittee heard several reports that
these foundations were deteriorating. The 1987 Defense Science
Board study on Technology Base Management, chaired by
10
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Provost John Deutsch
concluded that "our national technological advantage has
eroded significantly in recent years."
Also, at a 1988 hearing, Dr. Cliff Duncan, Director of
Defense Research and Engineering, testified that the DoD
software producibility program was underfunded, despite the
urgency addressing that problem.2 In addition, there was
concern that DoD and DoE were not taking advantage of all
resources available. This situation led to the question of
whether truly critical technologies were severely underfunded
in the DoD request to the Congress and whether the DoD had a
prioritized science and technology (S&T) program.
Senator Jeff Bingaman, Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Defense Industry and Technology, originated the idea of
requesting the DoD and the DoE to jointly submit a CTP. This
plan was originally expected to identify ten technologies that
were considered to be the most significant to the long-term
superiority of US weapons systems. After some discussion, the
requirement for ten technologies was thought to be too
restrictive and the number was increased to twenty.
The first and second CTPs were required by Public Laws
100-456 September 29, 1988 and 101-189 November 29, 1989
respectively. Senate bill S.2884 was introduced July 10, 1990
2 Senator Jeff Bingaman, Hearings before the Committee on
Armed Services, United States Senate, Part 7 Defense Industry and
Technology, March 17, 1989, p. 2.
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to renew the requirement for the CTP. Each year these laws
have changed slightly in scope and conditions. However, the
basic purposes and intent of this policy have not changed.
B. LEGISLATIVE INTENT
The requirement for the CTP has several prominent and
implied purposes. First, the most obvious purpose is to
identify, prioritize, consolidate and focus critical
technologies requirements and milestones within DoD and DoE.
Second, with these technologies identified, the list can be
used to allocate resources in the budgeting process. Third, it
provides an avenue for the Congress and DoD to scrutinize and
manage programs that employ these critical technologies. The
plan can serve as a roadmap for both the Congress and DoD to
follow in the oversight of the technology base programs.
Lastly, the policy requires that we compare the US with
foreign countries on the progress in each critical technology
area. This last condition allows for monitoring of foreign
progress and possibly enhanced cooperation between allies by
describing their relative strengths and weaknesses.
Underlying these goals are others, starting with the
requirement for DoE and DoD to submit a joint plan. This
condition was meant to strengthen the coordination between the
two agencies. This requirement would also facilitate the
contribution of DoE's weapons laboratories in meeting the DoD
critical technology needs. The plan can also be used as a
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"report card," identifying advances and deficits in the
pursuit of critical technologies. It should be mentioned here
that these critical technologies should not be confused with
the Military Critical Technologies List which is used to
control the export of technologies.
C. THE 1989 CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES PLAN
1. Legal Requirements
Public Law 100-456, the National Defense Authorization
Act, Fiscal Year 1989 of September 29, 1988 required that the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, in consultation
with the Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs,
submit a plan, not later than March 15 of each year, for
developing the 20 technologies considered to be the most
essential to ensure the long-term qualitative superiority of
US weapons systems. The plan was to consider both product and
process technologies.
The content of the plan was to consist of:
1. The reasons for technology selection.
2. Milestone goals for development.
3. Amount contained in the budgets of DoD, DoE and other
departments and agencies for support and development.
4. A comparison of the positions of the US and other
industrialized nations, specifically the Soviet Union,
in the development of such technology.
5. Extent the US should depend on other countries to
develop technologies.
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6. Potential contributions that allies of the US can
make.
7. Potential contributions the private sector can make.
The law required that the first plan be submitted in 1989. The
full statement of Section 823, PL 100-456, is reproduced in
Appendix A.
2. Planning Process
The development of the CTP was based on the investment
strategy planning process that is part of the S&T program in
the DoD. An overview of this process is shown in Figure 1. The
process begins with planning factors, which change with threat
conditions. These planning factors are national priorities
that are set by the President. The defense objectives, policy
and strategy follow, as established by the Secretary of
Defense. Then the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the three services
perform mission area analyses. With this information the
office of Director, Defense Research and Engineering (Research
and Advanced Technology) [DDR&E(AT)] working closely with the
three services, develops the technology investment strategy.
The Secretary of Defense issues, for each budget cycle,
defense guidance detailing what should be done to accomplish
the investment strategy.
The DoD planning process makes S&T investment
activities more visible to both planners and users. The CTP
has the same basic objectives as the investment strategy, and
14
Defense, Mission Area
Objectives, Policy. Analysesaand Strategy e lnigFcos1
Erbln Technology Area Future MilitaryT a ,ologies Major ThCust Capabilities
and Goals and Options
Emerging SAT Investment TVion
Technologies Strategy and G oal s
Crtical Technologies ] [ Defense Guidance JC
Congress: j[i Programs CongressI 060 SAT E
OWview
Figure 1. DoID Science and Technology (S&T) Strategic Planning Proces( 2
Notes with Figure 1:
(1) Planning Factors include the world situation, budget contraints, Presidential guidance.
Congressional mandates, etc.
(2) This block diagram cannot show all the many interactions that take place informally.
Source: Department of Defense Critical Technologies Plan,
Revised, May 5, 1989, p 4.
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is a natural output of the existing process.' An important
distinction between the CTP and the investment strategy is
that the former focuses only on the star performers, those
technologies that make the most notable difference, while the
latter takes into account all considerations.4
3. Selection Criteria
Critical technologies were selected on the basis of
one or more of the Performance and Quality Design criteria
listed below:
PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
1. Technologies that enhance performance of conventional
weapon systems.
2. Technologies that provide new military capabilities.
QUALITY DESIGN CRITERIA
1. Technologies that improve weapon systems' availability
and dependability.
2. Technologies 5 that improve weapon systems'
affordability.
To qualify as "critical", the technology would have to improve
one or more of these criteria by a factor of about three.
3 Department of Defense, Critical Technologies Plan, Revised,
May 5, 1989, p. 3.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., p. 5.
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4. Selected Critical Technologies
The following critical technologies were selected:
1. Microelectronic Circuits and Their Fabrication
2. Preparation of Gallim Arsenide (GaAs) and
Other Compound Semi-Conductors
3. Software Producibility
4. Parallel Computer Architectures
5. Machine Intelligence/Robotics









15. Computational Fluid Dynamics
16. Air Breathing Propulsion






22. Biotechnology Material Processing
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It is important to note that the CTP list of critical
technologies "should not be regarded as a closed list.
Technologies related to nuclear weapons and their effects,
because of their special nature, are not included in this
plan."
These 22 technologies are summarized in Appendix B.
This summary includes an overview explanation, impact on
weapons systems and comparison with other countries. Table 1
is a summary of foreign technological capabilities in each of
the areas identified in the first CTP.
5. Reaction to 1989 CTP
It is generally accepted that the 1989 CTP was a good
if not excellent first effort. This evaluation is given in
light of the stringent time constraints 
- six months - under
which it was developed (the law was enacted on September 29,
1988 and the plan was due March 15, 1989). When one realizes
that the plan had to be revised and was reissued on May 5,
1989, one can truly estimate the time needed to put together
such a comprehensive plan. This extra time was needed to
refine the comparisons with other countries for each
technology. There were, however, some criticisms about the
1989 plan.
In an article in SIGNAL, February 1990, four
deficiencies were observed by Senator Jeff Bingaman. First,
the plan followed the (Presidential] budget submission and
18
Table I. Summary of Foreign Technological Capabilities
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Revised, May 5, 1989, p 11.
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therefore the correlation of funding estimates between the
[approved] budget and the Presidential budget was weak.6
Second, lead organizations and a development plan for the
technology from this organization were not clear. Third,
process technologies, seen as long neglected by DoD, were not
given enough emphasis compared to product technologies.
Finally, the international comparisons were viewed as having
major gaps. These gaps were examined and a subsequent revised
plan was produced as mentioned above.
From the congressional hearings held in May of 1989,
other observations and comments on the 1989 CTP are worth
noting. First, of the twenty-two critical technologies, 12 to
14 are what might be characterized as duel use technologies.
Duel use indicates a possible exploitation in both the
military and civilian sectors. Second, the plan must be
reevaluated continuously because of the changing environment
and pace within which technology changes. Third, the critical
technologies must be integrated into the overall S&T plan
along with other supportive technologies. Fourth, greater use
of prior technology studies and reports would provide more
inputs to meet congressional needs. Finally, missing areas of
6 Senator Jeff Bingaman, Signal, February 1990, p. 59.
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technology to be considered for future studies should include
7
those more focused in undersea warfare such as sonar.
D. 1990 CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES PLAN
1. Legal Requirements
The primary conditions (identification of 20 critical
technologies, DoE involvement and submission by March 15) of
the CTP remained the same from the 1989 requirement. However,
in an attempt to correct and deal with perceived deficiencies
in the first submitted plan, Public Law 101-189 of November
29, 1988 added additional requirements and clarified others.
The full statement of Section 605, PL 101-189 is reproduced in
Appendix B. This law added a new paragraph titled "Priorities
and Funding" and the content was expanded.
The major change from the 1988 ldw was to include the
requirement to:
designate priorities for development of the technologies
identified in the plan and specify funding requirements of
the Department of Defense, the Department oL Energy and
other appropriate departments and agencies for the
development of the technologies identified in the plan for
the five fiscal years following the year the plan is
submitted.
This is in contrast to the 1988 requirement to report the
amount contained in the budget for the support and development
7 Electronic Industries Association, review of Defense
Department's Critical Technologies Plan, May 5, 1989, p. 2.
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of the technologies for the fiscal year the report was
submitted.
The content of the plan was expanded by requiring the
inclusion of two new segments. Both of these segments dealt
with the technology selection process. The first of these
sections was to be a discussion of the consideration of the
most recent biennial report submitted to the President by the
National Critical Technologies Panel under title IV of the
National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and
Priorities Act of 1976. The second section was to address the
relationship of the technology to the overall S&T program and
the long-term funding strategy.
Additionally, the plan was to designate a lead
organization responsible for the development of the
technology, and a description of this organization's plan,
including milestones and goals. Besides expanding the funding
requirements description in the Priorities and Funding
paragraph, the plan was to contain the amounts in the budget
for the five preceding fiscal years, the current fiscal year,
and each fiscal year that the Secretary of Defense has
prepared a budget.
Under the requirement to compare the US, in the
development of these technologies, to other industrial
nations, language was added requiring a comparison to the
degree of accessibility. This comparison was to contain the
accessibility the US has to research conducted in allied
22
nations, the access allied countries have to US research and
the effect of any imbalance in such access. Also, the plan was
to describe the trends in the industrial base of such
countries and the competitiveness of the industrial base in
the US. Lastly, the plan was to discuss the extent of actions
that the Federal Government should take to maintain and
improve the industrial base and research efforts in the US.
2. Planning Process
The 1990 plan was developed by a working group chaired
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), with
representatives from the Army, Navy, Air Force, the Strategic
Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Defense Nuclear Agency
(DNA), OSD Offices, Department of Energy (DOE) Headquarters
and National Laboratories (Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and
Sandia).8 Several meetings were held with representatives of
the Aerospace Industries Association, the Electronics
Industries Associations and the National Security Industrial
Association to discuss ongoing activities in strategic
planning for science and technology. The technologies were
selected as "critical" by a group of senior DoD officials with
responsibility for the S&T program, based on the working
group's recommendations.
8 Department of Defense, Critical Technologies Plan, March 15,
1990, p. ES-i.
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The critical technologies are contained in the
technology areas of the S&T Investment Strategy. The
development of this strategy was discussed previously under
the planning process for the 1989 CTP, and was published in
1990 for the first time in a separate report. The investment
strategy developed twelve major long-term goals from vision
statements of needed military capabilities fifteen to twenty
years in the future. Table 2 shows the linkage between the
goals and the 20 critical technologies.
3. Selection Criteria
The four parameters in performance and quality design
criteria remained the same as the previous year, with two
criteria being added. These two are:
MULTIPLE USE CRITERIA
1. Pervasiveness in major weapon systems.
2. Strengthening the industrial base.
To be considered as "critical," major improvements in one or
more selection criteria are sought. This definition of
critical is consistent with the previous year's selection
process.
4. Selected/Prioritized Critical Technologies
The priorities of the twenty critical technologies
were assigned by a senior committee from DoD and DoE with
management responsibility for the S&T program. Group A
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Table 2. Major Linkages Between Critical Technologies
and Major Long-Term Goals for the S&T Program
Goal
Critical Technology 8.
I. SemigconductorMaterials aM Micro- --
electronic COrcuiW
2. Software ProduCibity - - - - - -
3. Parallel Computer Anilectres X X X X
4. Machine Intelligence and Rowoics x X x X x x
5. Siation and 14aAeling x x x x x x
S. Photorucs I I x X1
7. Sensitive Radas X x I x X X I
a. Passive Sensors X X x X x x
9. SignalProcesing X XXX X Ix x
10. Signature can"e X X1 I X I
11. Weapon System Eriironmerit X X X X X x
12. Date Fuion X x x x x X _X
13. Computational Fluid Dynam'ics X X x x
14. Air-Breathl Propulsion X x X X X X
15. Pulsed Power x I xx
16. Hypervelocity Projcliles x x I x IxI
17. High Energy Density Materials X x X X x xI
Is. Composite Materias -- - - - -
19. Superconductivity X X X x
20. Biotechnology Materials and x Xx
Processes
Source: Department of Defense Critical Technologies Plan,
March 15, 1990, p 4.
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contains the highest priority followed by Groups B and C. The
order within each group, listed below, does not reflect the
priority within that group. Group A technologies are the most
pervasive; those in Group B are enabling technologies which
can give the most immediate advances; and those in group C are
technologies whose application is farthest in the future and
are primarily enabling technologies.
9













10. Machine Intelligence and Robotics
11. Parallel Computer Architectures
12. Sensitive Radars




14. Simulation and Modeling
15. Weapon System Environment
GROUP C
16. Biotechnology Materials and Processes




Fifteen titles remain the same as the previous year. Four
major changes were made. First, segments of technologies
titled Integrated Optics and Fiber Optics were redistributed
into two titles, Semiconductor Materials and Microelectronic
Circuits and Photonics. Photonics emphasizes optical
information processing.
Second, Signal Processing replaced Automatic Target
Recognition. Automatic Target Recognition is seen as a
requirement included under Signal Processing.
Third, High Powered Microwaves and Phased Arrays were
removed. However, features of these technologies are included
in Pulsed Power, Signal Processing and Sensitive Radars.
Finally, two new technologies were introduced: High
Energy Density Materials and Weapon System Environment. High
Energy Density Materials is concerned with improved explosive
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munitions, and with improved propellants for rockets.
0
Weapon System Environments influences weapon system design and
is a factor in the "long-term qualitative superiority" of US
weapon systems.
1 1
The two new technologies are detailed in Appendix D
along with the revised funding requirements for each
technology. A summary assessment of foreign technological
capabilities in the twenty critical technologies relative to
the US is shown in Table 3.
5. Reaction to 1990 CTP
The DoD's second attempt at a critical technologies
plan was almost twice the length of the first, 236 pages
versus 124 pages respectively. Yet in Armed Services Committee
discussions the committee stated that it was "deeply
disappointed in the Defense Department's inability to provide
a comprehensive plan addressing the development of
technologies critical to the national defense." The committee
clearly noted that the plan still lacks some key elements that
they thought should be included.
The major criticism of the plan was its deficiency in
planning for the future development of the critical
technologies. In this planning the committee believed that the
DoD should discuss how it was going to organize the resources
10 15id., p. 6.
" Ibid.
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Table 3. Summary of Foreign Technological Capabilities
Critical Technologiee USSR NATO Allies Japan Others
1. Semocoouca Mauro* rid Moraectuic brew_
Circuits
2 Softwa* Pvoiutity 0w" ve~coqje
I Paraii Cariipur Argchnwre s bwtn rwa.
4 Macmire Iniologece Wid FbWMZ rs.Wrs.Sa
5. swijia"Mr anid MoWiWV
6. Pihotonics 
_______ Q .m
T Seraitive Ratats 9 w
a. Passive Seoos E
10. Sognairs Corwol i 1
11. Weapom System Eorwvnt C 0 V-.ix Coumm
12. Data Fusicin 1-
14 Ar.5'mstiviV Prmpuoiom
*S. Pujma Power Vamn Courwis
16. H sirveocty Pfolecals
7 Higr EwgY Dery Mehurs
1S Compcoite Matormust.
119 Supeicomnaucavty S.Umun
20. boteeninowog Materaw anid Piscine V9rio CouMfie
LEGEND.
Poatto of USSR ugbesve a to Wied Stain Capabity of coews to codibuii ID Vhe Ischroogy
, w gruemla im n sw rchas of Iwraogy sogruicoily ahead in sre ce of technology
gw waby w a am vaIh the Uk mud Stavs moemle Of wakig "Idr WrigibuI100%
o wmeray baggig *sew Iriaw aren oetti of risking som CWWftso
E nm all swioiitr apects Q UNA"e~ 0 "wa "~ 4rineh5 Mnijo
Source: Department of Defense Critical Technologies
Plan, March 15, 1990, p 11.
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and assets available to achieve the technological objectives
set out in the plan. These resources include DoD in-house
laboratories, DoE national laboratories, universities and
colleges and US and foreign industries. In addition, the
committee urged the use of industry and association studies to
help in planning the development of the critical technologies.
Beyond this, the committee suggested, that in order to give
industry a more meaningful involvement, they be allowed to
prepare plans supplementing the strategic outlook.
Other areas identified as deficient included the
designation of lead activities, international cooperation and
identification of funding levels. The committee observed that
no lead activities were designated for any technology. This
requirement was directed by the 1990 law for inclusion in the
CTP. The committee wanted lead organizations found in military
service or Defense Agency technical organizations and
laboratories. It suggested that these selections be made by
the Director of Defense Research and Engineering from one of
these organizations. 12
Further, discussion of international cooperation as a
means of achieving the desired goals was seen as not being
addressed. Also, the committee suggested that the plan should
not concentrate on the current status of the US relative to
12 Senate Armed Services Committee, Acquisition Policy and
Management Report, 1990, p. ]79.
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other nations, but deal with the dynamic environment affecting
the position and prospects for each technology.13
Finally, the committee believed that to effectively
manage the critical technologies DoD, should be able to
"rapidly and accurately identify the levels of funding
allocated to, or planned for, each critical technology."
14
From statements published by the committee it is clear that
what they wanted was an identification of all the program
elements which support the development of the critical
technologies and the allocation of funds to technologies
within those program elements. Careful reading of Public Law
101-189 reveals no such requirement; however this language is
incorporated into proposed legislation for 1991.
E. 1991 CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES PLAN
Bill S.2884, introduced July 10, 1990, specifically
addresses the identification of program elements into the CTP.
In fact, it is the only major change to Section 2508 of title
10, United States Code, requiring an annual CTP. A
reproduction of the language finally adopted by Congress in
1990 is contained in Appendix C.
This new bill requires three parts relative to program
elements. First, each program element contained in the
13 Ibid., p. 180.
14 Ibid.
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President's budget that has funds allocated for the support of
any critical technology must be identified. Second, the amount
for each critical technology included by the program element
must be indicated. And third, this amount is to be compared
with the prior fiscal year's allocation.
Another approach to insuring the superiority of US weapons
systems is test and evaluation. The next chapter is devoted to
investigating the test and evaluation process. Emphasis is
placed on how the DoD plans for new technologies.
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III. WEAPON SYSTEM TEST AND EVALUATION
This chapter describes weapon system Test and Evaluation
(T&E) and how it relates to technology planning and resources.
This chapter begins with a description of the purpose and
functions of T&E, followed by an outline of the major
categories within T&E. Then the importance and contributions
of T&E are discussed. Contributions are explored within the
DoD procurement and program milestone framework. The next
section explores how DoD plans for the Major Range and Test
Facility Base (MRTFB) T&E resources. Finally, an attempt to
identify needed technical resources for T&E is introduced.
A. PURPOSE AND ROLES
The purpose of test and evaluation (T&E) is to provide a
technical management tool used to reduce risk throughout the
acquisition cycle. Testing involves the calculated and logical
production of data for technical and managerial personnel who
control development. The principal uses of this information
are for development, acquisition milestone decisions, and
operational utilization.
Although the terms "test" and "evaluation" are often found
together, they describe two clearly distinguishable functions.
"Testing" is the examination of hardware/software - models,
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prototypes, production equipment, computer programs - to
obtain data, necessary to develop new capabilities, manage the
process, or make decisions on resource allocation.15 The role
of testing systems under development is to identify and
resolve technical uncertainties and problems. While
information on such problems is generated primarily through
testing by the contractor, various government tests generate
data that is basic to the development of systems.
Testing also provides information for many of the major
milestone decisions. These decisions, such as initial
development and full-scale development, are investment
judgments. Selection makers are responsible for putting
available resources to their most productive use. Data on how
effective, reliable, maintainable and supportable a system is
aid in making these decisions.
Test data are also used by the operational community. An
output of the operational evaluation effort is the development
of tactics for the most effective use of the system.
"Evaluation" is the process in which data are logically
assembled and analyzed to aid in making systematic
decisions. 16 Evaluation is the review and analysis of
qualitative or quantitative data obtained from sources such as
15 Department of the Navy, RDT&E/Acquisition Management Guide,




design reviews, inspections, testing or operational use.
The process of evaluation begins with the identification of a
deficiency or need and the documentation of an operational
requirement. Next, critical issues need to be identified.
These critical issues must determine if the system meets the
requirement. Criteria must then be established to define
required performance thresholds and to evaluate progress in
reaching them. These issues are then broken down into
measurable test elements. From these elements testing is
conducted, test data are reviewed and analyzed, test results
are weighed against the evaluation criteria, and the
evaluation report is prepared.
B. CATEGORIES OF TEST AND EVALUATION
Tests are classified into three categories: Development
Test and Evaluation (DT&E), Operational Test and Evaluation
(OT&E) and Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation (PAT&E).
The maturity of the equipment tested, prototype to production,
determines the test category.
1. Development Test and Evaluation
Development Test and Evaluation is required for all
acquisition programs. It is planned, conducted, and monitored
by the developing agency or its designated organization.
Objectives of each phase are developed and published in the
17 Defense Systems Management College, Test and Evaluation
Management Guide, March 1988, p. 4-1.
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Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). Development Test and
Evaluation is conducted in three major phases. If necessary,
each phase may be divided into subphases.
Development Testing - I (DT-I) is conducted during the
demonstration and validation (D&V) phase to support the
Milestone II decision. A positive decision allows the program
to proceed into Full-Scale Development (FSD). The principal
purpose of DT-I is to demonstrate that all technical risks
have been identified and reduced, that the best technical
solutions have been selected, that engineering is now required
and the required technology is available.18
Development Testing - II (DT-II) is conducted during
FSD to support the Milestone III decision, which places the
system into production. It demonstrates that the design meets
specifications regarding performance, reliability,
maintainability, supportability, interoperability,
survivability, and vulnerability.19 The final part to DT-II
is a Technical Evaluation (TECHEVAL) of production hardware
and software to determine if the system meets design
specifications. In addition, the TECHEVAL assess whether the
system is ready to undergo the Operational Evaluation
(OPEVAL).
is op. cit., Department of the Navy, p. 7-9.
19 Ibid.
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Development Testing - III (DT-III) is conducted after
the production decision. Its purpose is to ensure that system
improvements identified during TECHEVAL, OPEVAL and Follow-On
Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) were performed and acceptable.
2. Operational Test and Evaluation
Operational Test and Evaluation determines the
system's operational effectiveness and suitability, and
provides information on tactics. These tests are unique
because they are conducted in a realistic environment, use
operational personnel and are performed against a simulated
enemy. Operational Test and Evaluation is divided into two
major categories. Initial OT&E (IOT&E) is testing that is
performed prior to the full production decision. Follow-On
OT&E is testing which-follows the production decision.
Operational Testing - I (OT-I) is IOT&E conducted
during the validation phase to support the FSD decision. It is
not required for most programs. Operational Testing - I is
scheduled for systems using new operational concepts with high
operational risks.
Operational Testing - II (OT-II) is IOT&E performed
during the full-scale development phase to support the
production and field introduction decisions. For major
programs entering Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP), the
director of OT&E must provide the Defense Acquisition
20 Ibid., p. 7-10.
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Executive, the Defense Acquisition Board, the SECDEF and
appropriate congressional committees a report of system
effectiveness and suitability before Milestone 111.21
Operational Evaluation (OPEVAL) is the final part of OT-II and
is conducted with a production representative system. This
testing is to begin no sooner than one month after TECHEVAL
testing.
Operational Testing - III (OT-III) is the first FOT&E
performed after production and normally before field
introduction. Usually, OT-III is conducted with the same pilot
production system used in OPEVAL. Objectives include the
testing of production fixes, tactics development, completing
any deferred IOT&E and assessing operational availability.
Operational Testing - IV (OT-IV) is FOT&E performed on
production systems. The initial objective of OT-IV is the
demonstration of achievement of objectives for production
system operational effectiveness and suitability. Other
objectives may include OT&E of the system in other
environments, applications, or against new threats.
3. Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation
Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation (PAT&E) is
testing conducted on production items to demonstrate that they
meet contract specifications. These production tests are
21 Ibid., p. 7-11.
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usually performed on a sample of the actual number of systems
manufactured. The objectives of PAT&E are described in the
TEMP. Most PAT&E is the responsibility of the developing
agency, but in some cases can be done by the manufacturing
contractor.
4. Joint and Multiservice Test and Evaluation
The terms multiservice and joint testing are sometimes
confused and used interchangeably. However, multiservice T&E
is conducted on a system being acquired for use by one or more
Service.22 One Service is designated as the lead Service and
is responsible for the management of the program. All Services
procuring the system participate in the conception,
performance, and evaluation of a multiservice test program. In
contrast, joint test and evaluation is sponsored and funded by
the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). Joint T&E programs are not
acquisition oriented. They are a means of examining joint
Service tactics and doctrine. Past joint test programs have
been conducted to provide information required by the
Congress, by OSD, by the commanders of the Unified and
Specified Commands and by the Services.23
22 op. cit., Defense Systems Management College, p. 3-7.
23 Ibid. p. 3-8.
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C. IMPORTANCE/CONTRIBUTIONS
Test and Evaluation is used as a risk management tool.
Risk management balances system combinations/options such as
improved performance versus maintainability, reliability or
cost. Risk, which is usually minimized, requires pertinent
data in order to make intelligent decisions. Pertinent and
reliable data are the outcome of T&E endeavors. Test and
Evaluation of parts and subsystems can also be used to reduce
risk in a developmental and procurement effort of a new
system. Thus, T&E may reduce cost, schedule and technical
risks.
Test and Evaluation results play an important part in
design and milestone decision reviews. The executive who has
final decision responsibility must examine the critical issues
and weigh the facts on hand. These facts, provided by the T&E
process, may be unfavorable in some areas. This is where the
balance of capabilities and shortcomings - risk management -
is decided by the responsible executive.
Progress of T&E is monitored by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) throughout the procurement process.
Their oversight extends to the major materiel acquisitions or
designated acquisitions, which is about 5 percent of all the
acquisitions being managed within DoD.24  The Defense
Acquisition Board, Defense Acquisition Executive, and the
24 Ibid., p. 2-5.
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Secretary of Defense make procurement assessments based on the
following T&E information:
1. The Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP).
2. Service test agency reports and briefings.
3. Development T&E data from program managers,
laboratories and contractors.
4. Detailed supporting documents developed by Service
activities.
During the Concept Exploration/Definition Phase, prior to
Milestone I, studies, analyses, simulation, and test data are
used by the development agency to explore and evaluate designs
proposed to satisfy the requirements.25 The Operational Test
and Evaluation Agency (OTA) monitors the T&E during this
p1.Lizd to gather information for future T&E planning. At the
end of this period the development agency puts together the
DT&E System Concept Report to record and present T&E results
of system designs compared to stated requirements. This report
is incorporated into the Systems Concept Paper (SCP) and the
status briefing for a Milestone I decision. The OSD evaluates
the T&E of system alternatives based on requirements
established in an approved TEMP.
During the Concept Demonstration/Validation Phase, prior
to Milestone II, concepts that are demonstrated and validated
provide a foundation for detailed test planning. The
25 Ibid.
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development agency conducts development test and evaluation on
components, subsystems and prototypes to ensure that
engineeritig is reasonably complete.
The operational T&E agency estimates the system's
operational effectiveness, maintainability, supportability and
suitability. These estimates are accomplished through testing
performed by operational personnel in realistic field
conditions. Information on tactics, organization and personnel
requirements are identified along with recommended
modifications. The results of demonstration and validation
DT&E are prepared in a report by the development agency. This
report is reviewed by the Service Headquarters and the Service
acquisition review council prior to system acquisition review
by DoD.26 Concurrently, the OT&E agency prepares an
independent report which presents the estimates of the
system's operational effectiveness. Both of these reports are
used to support the Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP). The
DCP, prepared for Milestone II, is used to recommend
proceeding to full-scale engineering development.
The Milestone III decision approves progress to the full-
rate production/deployment phase. If the magnitude of the
program is sufficiently large and/or the time between the
beginning of low-rate initial production and full rate
production is significantly long, there may be a need for a
26 Ibid., pp. 2-8.
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Program Review or Milestone IIIA before the Milestone 1IT
decision point.27 Test and Evaluation activities during this
period yield much useful information. The data are used to
assess the critical technical issues which are specified in
program documents.
These technical issues include:
1. Satisfying specifications
2. Identifying deficiencies
3. Recommending corrective actions
4. Determining interoperability
5. Estimating reliability, maintainability, and
availability
6. Determining whether the system is safe to
undergo OT&E
7. Assessing technical risk and evaluating tradeoffs
8. Validating configuration changes
9. Assessing survivability, vulnerability and
supportability
10. Determining system performance limitations
11. Verifying technical documentation concerning
operation and maintenance
Operational T&E performed prior to the production decision
achieves the following:
1. Estimating operational effectiveness and suitability
27 Department of Defense, Directive 5000.2, Defense Acquisition
Program Procedures, September 1, 1987, p. 3.
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2. Recommending and evaluating changes in configuration
3. Developing logistic support, training, and tactics
4. Determining acceptable technical publications and
support equipment
5. Estimating survivability in an operational environment
After the production decision has been made, Milestone III
T&E activities continue to provide insights. Government
representatives normally monitor or conduct Production
Acceptance Test and Evaluation (PAT&E). Post production
testing may lead to pre-planned product improvements, or what
is known as "block upgrades."
The OT&E agency continues with OT&E in the form of FOT&E.
Usually FOT&E is performed in two phases. The first phase
consists of verifying the operational effectiveness and
suitability of the production system which may have been
accomplished earlier. The second phase is conducted by the
user to refine tactics and training for the life of the
system. The OT&E agency prepares a final report at the
conclusion of FOT&E. This report records test results, relates
evaluation to critical issues, and documents the assessments
of deficiencies resolved.
Test and Evaluation is the primary means of predicting
and/or assessing the performance of a weapon system. The
results are important in making key decisions in the
procurement process. This is especially true for the decision
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to proceed from full-scale development to production.
Operational Test and Evaluation provides an indication of how
well the new systen will work in the battlefield before it is
produced.
D. TEST AND EVALUATION RESOURCES AND PLANNING
The Department of Defense defines test resources as a
"collective term that encompasses all elements necessary to
plan, conduct, collect and analyze data from a test event or
program." These elements can include funding, personnel, test
articles, models, simulations, instrumentation, targets,
tracking and data gathering equipment and data reduction
equipment. One place the Department of Defense manages these
elements, to support the development and operation of weapon
systems, is in the DoD T&E facilities.
1. Major Range and Test Facility Base
All of the Services operate ranges and test facilities
for test, evaluation and training purposes. Twenty-one of
these activities form the DoD Major Range and Test Facility
Base (MRTFB). The MRTFB is a national asset which is to be
sized, operated, and maintained primarily for DoD test and
evaluation support missions, but is also available to all
users having a valid requirement for its capabilities.28 A
list of MRTFB activities are in Table 4 and their locations
28 Department of Defense, Directive 3200.1, Major Range and
Test Facility Base, September 29. 1980, p. 1.
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are shown in Figure 2. Summaries of the capabilities of each
of these activities can be found in DoD Directive 3200.11-D.
The MRTFB facilities can be used by all the Services,
other US Government agencies, and when authorized allied
foreign governments and private organizations. Test resource
scheduling is based on the existing Military Department
priority and precedence rating system. However, DoD Directive
3200.11 does specify that time restrictions and equitable
considerations be given to minimize delays in lower priority
projects.
Funding is done on a reimbursable basis. For DoD
component users, reimbursement is for direct costs which can
be identified readily with the particular program. All other
federal and nonfederal agencies are to pay for direct and
indirect costs. The Deputy Director, Defense Research and
Engineering (DDDR&E(T&E)) sets policy for the composition,
use, and test program assignments of the MRTFB.9
2. Major Range and Test Facility Planning
Planning for the MRTFB can be categorized by the
organizations responsible for that planning. Users provide
funding and requirements for testing a weapon system. MRTFB
activities support, manage and coordinate day-to-day
operations of the activity. They are also tasked to develop


















MAJOR RANGE AND TEST FACILITY BASE SUMMARY






Pacific Missile Test Center
Naval Air Test Center
Naval Weapons Center
Naval Air Propulsion Center
Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center"
Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility
Eastern Space and Missile Center
Western Space and Missile Center
Arnold Engineering Development Center
Tactical Fighter Weapons Center
Utah Test and Training Range
Armament Division - 3246th Test Wing
Armament Division - 6585th Test Group
Aeronautical Systems Division - 4950th Test Wing
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Source: DoD 3200.11-D
and maintain a master plan for developing and operating the
MRTFB. Secretaries of the Military Departments plan, program
and budget for development and are tasked with long-term
management and operations of each MRTFB activity. In addition
to setting policy the DDDR&E (T&E) monitors and evaluates the
MRTFB for adequacy and duplication. The focus of this
discussion will be on plans to develop the individual ranges
and test facilities.
In the middle of the 1980's several factors led to the
realization that DoD's T&E capabilities were approaching a
crisis situation. These factors included congressional
concerns for adequate weapon system testing, emerging
technologies, very low average investment rate and projected
long-term fiscal reductions.30 Effective investment in
modernization was to be obtained through better coordinated
DoD wide management.
Several actions were taken in response to the T&E
concerns. First, the Director of OT&E was established in 1984
and placed on what was then called the Defense Review Board
(DRB). Second, in the summer of 1986 the Deputy Secretary of
Defense established an OSD central funding line for OT&E.
Third was the establishment of the Test and Evaluation
Committee (TEC). Finally, in November of 1988, DoD established
Mr. P. Horner, Test Resources Master Plan Briefing, Pacific
Missile Test Center, May 17, 1989.
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a central funding line for high priority T&E capability
investments.31 This funding was an OSD program element for
the Central T&E Investment Program (CTEIP).
The Test and Evaluation Committee (TEC) is the single
agent within the DoD responsible for the determination of
corporate T&E planning, programming and budgeting and
execution priorities and is responsible for reporting them to
the DRB.32 Among the responsibilities of TEC is to review
planning guidance included in the Test Resource Master Plan
(TRMP). The purpose of the TRMP is to define and guide
investments in T&E capabilities needed to support the
development, acquisition and operation of DoD weapon
systems.33 Specifically, prime goals are as follows:
1. Improve the ability to provide adequate evaluations of
weapon concepts and equipment.
2. Institutionalize the National Test Capabilities Base
(NTCB).
3. Ensure adequate, timely, cost effective test
capabilities.
The major focus of this plan is on major investments at MRTFB
activities.
31 Ibid.
32 Test and Evaluation Committee, Draft Test Resources Master
Plan, April 24, 1989, p. A2-2.
33 Ibid.
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The services continue to have the responsibility to
plan, budget and acquire needed test facilities. Subsequently,
the MRTFB activities usually have, within their organization,
a facilities planning department. Each Service and activity
submits and performs this planning according to the
requirements set by the chain of command. However, studies of
shortfalls or capabilities can be performed in-house or by a
contractor.
From these planning endeavors and the reports they
produce, both at the OSD and activity levels, the basis for
the next section of needed T&E resources is developed.
E. NEEDED TEST AND EVALUATION RESOURCES
The increasing battle space, complexity and
interdependence of DoD weapon systems dictate improved,
interrelated, highly efficient test capabilities.3 To
support and maintain these capabilities, long range planning
is required to anticipate future technology requirements.
These plans would identify activities associated with T&E and
theorize possible future technical requirements. They would
include an explanation of the problem, directional advice, and
an investment strategy.
Two recent attempts at planning for required T&E resources
have come from the TRMP and SRI International. First, the TRMP
34 Ibid., p. I-1.
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defines and guides investments in T&E capabilities needed to
support the development, acquisition and operation of DoD
weapon systems. Second, PMTC contracted SRI International to
conduct two surveys designed to look at the problem. Results
of these two efforts are discussed below.
1. The Test Resources Master Plan
The TRMP, drafted by the Test and Evaluation
Committee, identifies seven functional areas to categorize and
describe various planned and needed initiatives. These
functional areas aze:
1. Test mission command, control, communication and
instrumentation. Encompasses instrumentation
capabilities including scoring, tracking, target
control, communications, telemetry, data collection
and handling.
2. Electronic combat/threat/computational simulation
capabilities. Concerned with disciplines necessary for
electronic combat testing. Includes electronic
hardware and digital simulation.
3. Space systems test capabilities. Related activities
include test range capabilities, targets, threat
simulators, telemetry, data processing, flight safety,
launch processing and control.
4. Weapons effects test capabilities. Capabilities used
for lethality or survivability testing, including
nuclear and conventional threats.
5. Targets. Encompasses air, land, sea and underwater
targets plus required support equipment.
6. Environmental/physical test capability. Facilities and
capabilities needed to produce test environments such
as wind tunnels, vibration stands, structural tests
and weather chambers.
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7. Management initiatives and other. Includes management
issues, studies analyses, organizational and poliy
initiatives related to improving T&E capabilities.
2. SRI International Report
The report performed by SRI International was in
support of the US Navy T&E Technology Development Program. It
documents the results of two surveys relating to T&E
technology. The first survey developed T&E requirements based
on projected needs; the second survey recorded current and
recent technology research activities that might be
exploitable for T&E applications.
6
Separate procedures were used to develop both surveys.
The requirements study consisted of interviews with
individuals at the Pacific Missile Test Center, Naval Sea
Systems Command and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
The interviews provided a supporting overview and projection
of the character of T&E needs in the 1990's and potentially
into succeeding years.
Current and recent technology research activities were
identified by searching existing documentation. This
documentation was provided through the Work Unit Information
System (WUIS) database supported by the Defense Technical
35 Ibid., p. 11-8.
3 Philip K. Whalen, SRI International, Test and Evaluation
Technology Knowledge Base, March 1990, vol. I, p. 1.
37 Ibid., vol. I, p. 6.
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Information Center (DTIC). In surveying the DTIC WUIS
database, SRI identified several thousand technology research
candidates.
The analysis of the data from the WUIS search resulted
in six projects considered applicable to the T&E Technology
Exploratory Development Program. Within each project tasks and
subtasks were outlined to address the issues involved.
Analysis of the interviews provided a different perspective on
future T&E needs. However, most requirements were at least
partially covered by the six projects identified in the WUIS
search.
The following projects were identified by the SRI
report.
1. Test data collection, transmission, storage,
processing and display technologies.
2. T&E design and methodology.
3. On-board instrumentation sensor technology.
4. Low observable testing technology.
5. Modeling, simulation and stimulation technology.
6. Instrumentation platforms, targets and test support
technology.
Additional needs identified from the interview portion
of the study that are not listed above include:
1. Need for testing in all-weather conditions.
2. Accuracy in signatures emitted from low-observable
targets.
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3. Testing of very high velocity and hypervelocity
vehicles.
4. Testing of weapons based on directed energy
technology.
Individual facilities of the MRTFB support their own
mission and unique capabilities. However, a broader view of
the resources needed to perform T&E is required. This view
should reflect the needs of the entire T&E community. Such an
approach, based on the functions of T&E, is presented as a
foundation for the identification of T&E technology
requirements.
3. Functional Analysis
A function constitutes a specific action required to
achieve a given objective. For example, test ranges must
perform certain operations to record airspeed data. Such
actions may be accomplished through the use of equipment,
personnel, facilities, software, data or a combination
thereof. Within these functional areas there exist challenges
to maintain and perform T&E. These challenges will be
identified under each function.
Collecting and processing data are two primary
functions that can be identified from the definitions of test
and evaluation. Collection is all operations needed prior to
recording the appropriate raw data. These operations include
the examination of test items; instrumentation, targets,
simulation/modeling, environmental tests and range safety.
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Processing includes all functions necessary to record and
transform the raw data into a useable form. Processing
functions consist of recording, reduction and security of the
data.
Some functions, such as modeling or telemetry, could
be identified as either processing or collecting. In these
situations a subjective decision is made to determine which
category it falls under. T&E functions are listed in Table 5.
The functional areas and challenges are defined in the next
two sections.
a. Collection Functions
Instrumentation is hardware that enables data on
test parameters to be collected. Instrumentation sub-functions
include tracking, scoring, sensing, and communication.
Tracking provides time, space and positioning information on
platforms, targets and test objects in the range. Scoring
provides data on the relative space interval between the
target and test object. Sensing functions measure key
environmental parameters with sufficient accuracy, coverage,
sensitivity and timeliness. These environmental parameters
include physical (meteorology) and electromagnetic data.
Sensing operations can be performed internally within the test
item, or externally based on the ground or on board a
platform. Communications involves the transferring of data.
Telemetry, which is the delivery of data from sensors to
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recording equipment, is part of this transfer of data.
Operator voice communication is another area of communication.
Besides the transfer of data between sensors and recorders,
communication is needed between ranges. Interoperability
between ranges for long range testing is a required
communication capability.
Challenges for instrumentation functions include
the ability to track/score high-speed, hypervelocity, low-
observable, and multiple test objects. Also, smart weapons and
submunitions require high resolution in tracking/scoring
capabilities. Future techniques in tracking/scoring encompass
the use of lasers, photonics and high resolution video.
Better sensing is needed to provide measurements of
the physical environment surrounding and internal to the
weapon system. The electromagnetic environment is of
particular interest. Technologies that will aid in achieving
better sensors are infrared and electro-optical radar.
Commonality among sensors will reduce the current practice of
uniquely modifying test objects for each project.
Communications between ranges lacks common
application software. Currently each MRTFB activity
independently develops its own unique test and evaluation
software, such as positioning information, command and
control, and safety of flight. Existing telemetry systems
38 op. cit., Test and Evaluation Committee, p. A1-4.
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will not support known near term requirements. The need for
high-capacity data rate systems has increased with significant
increases in performance and complexity of weapon systems. The
increased complexity can be seen in weapons using new smart,
submunition tactics. Other challenges for telemetry include
high quality error free transmissions while preserving
security.
Targets should closely simulate the characteristics
of threats so that realistic presentations can be made. The
targets should stress the weapon systems being tested in ways
that can be directly related to the stress that a real threat
would present in actual combat.
39
Challenges for future targets are the correct
emission of low-observable, electronic countermeasures,
visual, infrared and acoustic signatures. Target speeds,
flight profiles and altitudes are also important details of
the target presentation. High-speed, hypervelocity, low
altitude and space systems can be seen as possible future
problem areas for targets.
Simulation and modeling is non-live fire testing
that is mainly done on computers. Modeling is the research and
programming of test object parameters. For example,
performance characteristics such as velocity are entered into
39 op. cit., Philip K. Whalen, SRI International, vol. I, p.
49.
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the computer. Simulation takes these parameters, interfaces
them and with given starting conditions, sets them "into
motion."
Simulations can be purely analytical or hardware-
integrated. For example, analytical simulation of a tactical
missile can include trajectory, separation, emulation, and
lethality simulations.40 As systems become more complex and
sophisticated, hardware-integrated simulations have evolved
because of the difficulty in obtaining a valid analytical
41representation. The hardware integration approach yields a
more realistic test and avoids more complex modeling problems.
As testing requirements become increasingly complex and
demanding simulation takes on a more important role. Some test
situations cannot be performed safely in the controlled test
range and evaluations of highly complex and versatile systems
would require so many live operations and participants that
full testing is not economically feasible. 2 Future needs in
modeling relate to increasing the signature database. This
database includes friendly as well as threat signatures. This
task also covers development of improved techniques for
measuring target signature characteristics and implementation
0 Emil J. Eichblatt Jr., ed. "Test and Evaluation of the
Tactical Missile," vol. 119 of Progress in Astronautics and
Aeronautics, p. 130.
41 Ibid., p. 163.
42 Ibid., vol. I, p. 41.
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of these techniques to obtain needed measurements for the
database.4
Environmental testing addresses ground test
facilities used to subject models, components, sub-systems and
systems to physical environments. This testing is required to
provide development information and evaluate performance.
Facilities include wind tunnels, space chambers, environmental
chambers, acoustic chambers, structural test stands, and
engine test cells. There is currently a lack of hypersonic
ground test facilities with capabilities above mach five."
To meet the next generation of hypersonic vehicles the
requirement for these test facilities has increased.
Another task is the development of technology for
use in laboratory test chambers to simulate target and
background radar and infrared signatures. Space systems
require the capability to adequately test large structures.
There is no such national capability in the existing or
planned test facility base.45 In addition, it is anticipated
that a space chamber will be needed to test critical
performance characteristics of space sensor concepts and
designs under development.
43 Ibid., vol. I, p. 42.
op. cit., Test and Evaluation Comnmittee, p. Al-24.
45 Ibid., p. AI-26.
Ibid.
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Range safety refers to the ability to ensure
protection against mishaps during testing. This ability
pertains to both targets and test objects. The ability to
command and destruct all vehicles on the range is important in
maintaining safety. This ability can be internal to the
vehicle or external, as part of the range. A challenge for the
future ranges is to provide this command destruct capability
without modifying the test object. This reduction in
modifications enables the use of a more realistic production
system. More importantly, it produces a test closer to actual
combat.
b. Processing Functions
Processing functions deal mainly with the data that
is collected during testing. These processing functions
include data recording, reduction and security. Data recording
is comprised of storage, retrieval and archiving operations.
Data storage is the process whereby transmitted raw data is
stored upon some medium. These mediums can be magnetic tape,
disks, programmable chips, or paper. Retrieval of data can be
described as recouping data once it has been stored. It can be
seen as the "read" function, where storage is the "write"
process. Archiving is the means of preserving and filing data
for later retrieval.
The amount of data to be handled in future T&E
operations not only taxes transmission systems, but also the
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ability of systems used for data storage.47 The challenge is
to be able to store, recall and locate vast amounts of data.
This can either be done by increasing the number of actual
storage mediums, or by increasing the capacity of individual
mediums. Another related challenge will be the time needed to
write, read and locate data. For example, there exists a
difference in time of reading a computer program using a
floppy disk or hard drive. The hard drive is much faster and
able to store more information.
Reduction of data is the operation of separating
relevant and important sections of data for analysis. Once the
data is reduced it has to be displayed. This presentation can
take many forms and is important in providing a "quick look"
capability. Pre-processing can aid in reducing the amount of
raw data.
The challenge is to develop techniques to automate,
accelerate and improve processing techniques. Techniques to be
considered in this effort include development of improved
analysis tools through better techniques. These techniques
include faster and more mathematically-sophisticated software,
artificial intelligence, expert systems, parallel processing,
neural networks and modular design concepts.
8
47 op. cit., Philip K. Whalen, SRI International, vol. I, p.
17.
48 Ibid., vol. I, p. 25.
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Data security is signal conditioning, modulation
and encoding of data. Its purpose is to maintain the integrity
of the data while securing it from collection. Compromise of
information during test and evaluation can permit adequate
lead time for foreign governments to develop countermeasures.
There are inadequate provisions in existing and planned test
capabilities for ensuring against unauthorized (hostile)
collection of data on the capabilities of weapons during test
and evaluation.
49
The challenge is to provide data security for new
telemetry systems. These systems, as mentioned previously,
will transfer much more data. In addition there is a need to
update current encryption techniques. Artificial intelligence,
mathematical structures, algorithms, parallel processing and
sub-miniature telemetry technologies all have implications for
telemetry signal conditioning problem.50
The TRMP, the SRI International reports, and the
author's analysis describe the functions and future challenges
in T&E. These plans, reports and analysis try to relate the
operations performed by T&E to future required resources. It
should be noted that the operations identified assume that the
planned test will provide the necessary data for the decision
making process. This is not always the case. However, for the
49 op. cit., Test and Evaluation Committee, p. Al-10.
50 Ibid., p. A-9.
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purpose of this analysis the technical aspects of the T&E
functions were emphasized. They will form the basis for
assessing the impact of the Critical Technologies plan on T&E.
In the next chapter the author's list of T&E
functions, shown in Table 5, will be the foundation for
evaluating and analyzing the impact of the Critical
Technologies Plan on T&E. A matrix will be developed to relate
critical technologies to T&E functions.
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IV. IMPACT OF THE CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES ON THE TEST AND
EVALUATION FUNCTIONS
The impact of the Critical Technologies Plan (CTP) on Test
and Evaluation (T&E) is assessed in terms of the T&E functions
introduced in Chapter III. First, a reactive or defensive
impact is described. Ten of the twenty critical technologies
that are assessed as having the greatest impact in a reactive
way are analyzed. Second, a proactive or offensive impact is
discussed. All twenty critical technologies are analyzed from
this viewpoint.
A. REACTIVE IMPACT
An obvious impact the critical technologies will have on
T&E is a reactive one. In many cases the CTP introduces and
specifies new abilities in weapon systems. Reaction will be
required from the Services, particularly the Major Range and
Test Facility Base, on how to test these new technologies.
Most of these technologies are hardware or software
related. For example, new hardware is projected in Air-
Breathing Propulsion, Hypervelocity Projectiles, Composite
Materials, Pulsed Power, and Signature Control.
In Air-Breathing Propulsion, the development of hypersonic
technology, primarily scramjets, has the potential to extend
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military missions to new flight regimes.51 This would require
a test and evaluation activity to expand its test range to
cover these increased performance and mission capabilities.
Hypervelocity Projectiles will tax current T&E abilities
in tracking and scoring of test objects. This is certainly a
concern during weapon/target interception.
Advanced Composite Materials produce difficulties in
structural testing. This is particularly true in determining
strength characteristics and structural soundness after
damage.
Signature Control technology will produce difficulties in
tracking and sensing. Advancement of stealth technology
through Composite Materials will present a major challenge to
the tracking and sensing functions. In addition, targets will
have to mimic the signature characteristics of the threat.
This not only includes absolute levels but also fluctuation
rates. 52
Lastly, safety factors could present problems in High
Energy Materials and testing Pulsed Powered Weapons. Used as
propellants, High Energy Materials will increase the range and
velocity of test objects. Used as explosives, velocities and
pressures of detonation output will increase. Both of these
51Department of Defense, Critical Technologies Plan, March 15,
1990, p. A-154.
52 Ibid., p. A-113.
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factors will have to be considered during range safety
analysis. Also, the enormous voltages and currents of pulsed
power weapons, coupled with their long range capabilities will
require a unique solution to safety in testing.
New software related technologies include Parallel
Computer Architectures, Software Producibility, Semiconductor
Materials and Microelectronic Circuits, Signal Processing and
Photonics.
Software for Parallel Computer Architectures will entail
the development of new system software (operating systems,
languages, compilers and debuggers).53 The T&E community will
be required to maintain competency and testing abilities with
such new software. In addition, parallel processors are able
to execute currently infeasible computations.54 The increased
computing speeds made possible by parallel processing, will
result in more effective weapons at a lower cost. Other
challenges presented by parallel processing include
verification during testing of automatic target recognition,
"smart skins," and atmospheric modeling.
Verifying and testing the increasing number of lines of
code arising from the development of Software Producibility is
proving to be difficult. Also real-time performance
53 Ibid., p. A-20.
54 Ibid., p. A-34.
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evaluations and fault detection may require the development of
automatic software testing.
Microelectronics technology, improvements in computing
speed and complexity will challenge production and quality
assurance testing. Also, microelectronics technology may
affect self-test circuitry. Test and evaluation of system
maintenance and reliability will require the consideration of
such circuits.
Signal processing can automate wide area surveillance,
target search, classification, identification, tracking, and
aimpoint selection, as well as provide survivable
communications.55 Smart weapons and surveillance systems rely
on advanced signal processing to recognize and classify
targets. During T&E, the requirements for proper transmission
of these signals are vital.
Photonics, like parallel architectures, offers
improvements in computing speed. Photonic devices also offer
superior electromagnetic pulse and radiation hardness.56 It
is up to the testing agency to provide a system to test the
level of this radiation resistance. Photonics can also aid in
developing faster, smaller and more reliable, communications
and intelligence systems. The verification of signal rates
and reliability will be challenges the T&E community must
55 Ibid., p. A-101.
56 Ibid., p. A-66.
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meet. The above discussion has briefly outlined how ten of the
twenty critical technologies can impact test and evaluation
in a reactive manner. By precisely reading the CTP, all of the
technologies could be similarly analyzed. However, the main
focus of this chapter is to determine the impact of the CTP
in a proactive or offensive fashion.
B. PROACTIVE IMPACT
A proactive impact means that the test and evaluation
community would consider the CTP as a means of assistance.
Rather than regarding the CTP as a forecast of new weapons
that need to be tested, the perception would be that the
critical technologies identified in the plan may facilitate
the performance of test and evaluation activities. To expand
on this idea, input from the T&E community could be provided
to decision-makers involved in developing the CTP. Then the
critical technologies could be planned to further the MRTFB
capabilities. It is these two views which will be developed
in assessing the proactive impact of the CTP on test and
evaluation.
The framework used to analyze the proactive impact of the
CTP on T&E starts with the functional areas of T&E introduced
in Chapter III. A subjective assessment, with inputs from T&E
experts, was made to determine if the 1990 list of critical
technolocies could affect each T&E functional area (see Table
6). The discussion that follows explains the logic behind each
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assessment and describes the extent to which the critical
technologies can assist and possibly advance T&E operations.
1. Semiconductor Materials and Microelectronic Circuits
Improvements in the performance of computer hardware
coupled with decreasing costs have spread computing into many
areas. Consequently, this technology is viewed as making some
contribution in all areas of T&E. Processing functions will be
particularly affected by this technology. Data storage,
retrieval, archiving, reduction and display will benefit from
lower power demands, higher reliability, lower cost and very
high computing speeds. All collection functions utilize some
form of microelectronics. For example, tracking and scoring
functions may be enhanced by the ability to collect more
positional data faster. Environmental testing could have more
parameters, (humidity, acoustic noise, etc.) monitored and
controlled by these more efficient circuits. In particular,
communication systems will be able to expand with increased
circuit complexity and functionality.57 Also, target guidance
and control will use the same integrated circuits. Important
as microelectronics are today, future T&E systems will rely
more on advances in semiconductor fabrication.
2. Software Producibility
Software, as with microelectronics, has become
increasingly available and affordable. It has become the focus
57 Ibid.7 p. A-6.
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TABLE 6. SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT OF DOD CRITICAL
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3. Parallel Computer Architectures S S M S M M M M M M
4. Machine Intelligence and Rootics S S S S M
5. SimulationandModeling S S M S S S S S S S
6. Photonics S M S S S S
7. Sensitaie Radars pM S N S
8. Pauve Sensors S S N S
9. Signal Processing S S S NI
10. Signature Control s S S S S
11. Capon Sstem Enironment S S N S
12. Data Fusion S S S
13. Computational Fluid Dynamics S S N S
14. Air-Breathing Propulsion S S
15. Pulsed Powser S S S S
R). Hypervelocity Projectiles S S
17. High Energy Density M~aterials S M
IS. Composite Materials NI S S S
19. Superconductivity S S S S S
20. Biotechnology Materials and [S S
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M = capable of making major contributions
S = capable of making some contributions
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of functionality and flexibility in most large scale
58
systems. A major impact of the development of software will
be to maximize the potential of parallel processors. Parallel
processing will further enhance signal processing in
communications. Similarly, all of the T&E processing functions
will be impacted by Software Producibility. New algorithms and
programming technologies will improve the specific function of
data security. The promise of reusable software will increase
availability for all data recording functions along with data
reduction and display.
3. Parallel Computer Architectures
This critical technology has the potential to generate
a large impact on T&E. The exploitation of complex parallel
and distributed systems offers orders of magnitude
improvements in availability and dependability in
communication, data processing and engineering design.59
A major impact will affect data storage, retrieval,
archiving, reduction and security. The current ability to
access historical testing results and evaluation reports from
large, multi-site databases is an effective use of parallel
processing.
58 Ibid., p. A-19.
59 Ibid., p. A-21.
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High performance parallel computing will also enhance
simulation and modeling by increasing computing speed. For
example, lengthy calculations in predicting atmospheric
patterns and strategic defense system simulation are possible
with parallel computing.
Contributions will also be made in the tracking and
scoring function. Parallel systems will allow for faster
transmission of more data. These capabilities will allow
tracking of multiple objects and enhanced positional data.
4. Machine Intelligence and Robotics
Data security will experience a major impact from this
critical technology. A security challenge results from the
employment of artificial intelligence in tracking. Security,
oversight and control will decrease as autonomous systems
transmit sensitive data. Data security concerns will have to
be built into these intelligent data collecting systems.
Targets and range safety will benefit from the
development of machine intelligence and robotics. Command,
control and intelligent actions of autonomous robotic ground
and unmanned air vehicles will increase through expert
systems. This increased command and control of targets will
benefit range safety functions.
Robotics technology also involves creating and
controlling complex motion to perform manufacturing
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operations. These controlling abilities can be used in
environmental testing, where repetitive motions or hazardous
environments are required. Automatic tracking of test objects
may also gain performance from complex motion control.
5. Simulation and Modeling
This critical technology has the potential to generate
a large impact on T&E. It correlates directly to the
simulation and modeling T&E function. As the costs of weapon
systems increase and costs of simulation decrease, T&E will be
accomplished with more simulations validated by live-fire
tests.
The CTP describes two aspects of simulation and
modeling. The first of these, which does not directly apply to
T&E, is the cost effective training of personnel for operation
and maintenance of equipment. The other, however, describes
testing, system prototyping, computer based simulation and
modeling, and physical simulation. These activities directly
impact operations in T&E. This critical technology can also
have application to predictions of the physical effects of




Data processing functions will likewise benefit from
the development of Simulation and Modeling. Some contributions
will be realized in these areas because Simulation and
Modeling relies on computer hardware and software
improvements.61 Also, networking the accumulation of hundreds
of simulations will enhance the size and technicalities of a
common environmental database.
6. Photonics
The main area of utilization associated with photonics
lies with communications. Fiber optics will provide higher
bandwidth capabilities to ships, aircraft, and undersea
communications at lower cost than current cables by factors of
ten to 100.62 Low loss fibers would permit longer distance
communications and allow development of fiber guided missiles.
Optical storage discs and display devices are currently being
manufactured. These disks increase storage capacity and will
benefit the data recording functions of T&E. Fiber optic
sensors will also gain performance from development in this
technology.




Test and evaluation activities - tracking and sensing
(detection, classification, and identification) - will be
significantly enhanced by the development of this technology.
Ultra-wideband radars (operating at lower frequencies) offer
a potential to detect stealthy targets and will provide
simpler, lower cost, more reliable, radars.63 Integrated
sensor approaches will allow for multiple functions and
64collection of multiple target signatures. Scoring may be
enhanced by being able to detect low-observable and multiple
test objects. As mentioned previously, tracking and scoring of
multiple objects will also rely on parallel processing. Also,
navigation will improve for targets with the use of laser
radar imagery.
8. Passive Sensors
Development of passive sensors will reinforce the
larger sensing function of T&E. Multi-band passive infrared
and electro-optical sensors can reduce the sensitivity of
existing sensors to environmental and target signatures.65
Integrated sensors will allow for collection of multiple
63 Ibid., p. A-78.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., p. A-88.
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target signatures. Target and scoring functions will realize
important radar capabilities from passive sensors without the
radiation emitted needed to find test objects.
Superconductivity will allow the development of super
directive compact antennas. 6 These compact antennas will
have lower profiles and reduce the size and weight of guidance
systems in targets.
9. Signal Processing
Signal processing can be most utilized by the
communications/telemetry function. With the vast amounts of
data transmitted through sensors, signal processing can
extract relevant information. This process, which relies on
parallel processing and artificial intelligence, would reduce
the amount of data requiring reduction. Similarly, signal
processing can also automate tracking, scoring and sensing
functions. Although fully automatic target recognition is not
expected in the near term, immediate opportunities exist for
automatic target cuing.67 Neural network technology, which is
a critical aspect of signal processing, may increase the
capabilities of target command and control.
Ibid.
67 Ibid., p. A-101.
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10. Signature Control
The research in reducing signatures of weapons systems
will provide some contributions in simulation and modeling.
Target signatures and models used in simulations will become
more realistic as a result of this research. To a lesser
extent research in weapon system signatures will provide some
contributions to the collection functions of T&E. Testers will
be able track and sense test objects easier if they understand
the limits and characteristics of future signatures. The
emphasis here is use of the technology developed for low-
observable weapons systems to the T&E communities' advantage.
11. Weapons System Environment
This technology will have its greatest impact in
environmental testing. An increased understanding of
environmental factors associated with and affecting the use of
weapons will lead to more realistic production and acceptance
testing.
Improved data in atmospheric predictions, ocean
circulation and electromagnetic fluctuations can estimate the
potential leverage of environmental factors. These estimations
will aid in assessing system reliability, failure rate,
maintainability and operability. The development of predictive
ionospheric models will permit the maximum effectiveness of
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magnetic sensor systems. Integration of environmental
knowledge in the design of targets and test objects may lead
to a better understanding of their range characteristics. This
understanding could potentially improve range safety concerns.
12. Data Fusion
The synthesis of useful data from diverse sources will
significantly impact the data reduction function of T&E. It is
essential to the decision process that only relevant
information be presented for consideration. Without some form
of automated data fusion, decision makers may be overwhelmed
by increasing amounts of data. In addition, "quick look"
capabilities must be enhanced by integrating expert systems to
identify critical events during testing.
Communications and simulations could also benefit from
the filtering of data. Estimating sensor outputs and network
capacity will maximize these systems' capabilities. The amount
of transmitted data could actually be reduced before
recording. Trends analysis within recorded data, will lead to
the transmission of only critical data.
Data fusion requires the use of sensitive information.
Multi-level security procedures would have to be introduced to
8Ibid., p. A-120.
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insure exclusion, proper access, reliability and protection of
sources.
13. Computational Fluid Dynamics
This critical technology will improve simulation and
modeling functions of T&E. Computation fluid dynamics, coupled
with advances in computer hardware, will be able to simulate
test object characteristics. It will be employed through
computers to evaluate new shapes at multiple velocities and
fluid densities.
The calculation of fluid flow around bodies is one
consideration to improve performance characteristics of flight
vehicles, ocean vehicles and air breathing engines. This
technology can be applied to concepts such as target
maneuvering aerodynamics, propulsion, and signature treatment.
Comprehension of performance characteristics through
simulation can provide information for range safety and
tracking functions.
14. Air-Breathing Propulsion
Gas-turbine technology will make some contributions to
targets and flight safety. Since it is a major element of
targets, size, performance, mission capability, and life cycle
costs are directly dependent on the propulsion system.
Hypersonic targets will be possible with scramjet technology
developed in this area. Knowledge of test object and target
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performance characteristics will aid safety personnel in
determining range requirements during testing.
15. Pulsed Power
The ability to provide high power in light weight,
compact systems will impact targets, sensing and simulation.
Hypervelocity targets, rapid fire rates, and advanced
electromagnetic launchers are some applications that may be
furthered by this technology. Ultra-Wideband and laser radars
will benefit from the controlled solid-state switching needed
in the development of pulsed power.69
In addition to powering targets and sensing devices,
pulsed power technology is vital to assessing and simulating
the vulnerability of present and future systems to nuclear,
directed and kinetic energy weapon systems. From these
simulations, predictions can be made on required range safety
precautions.
16. Hypervelocity Projectiles
As mentioned in Pulsed Power, the ability to propel
projectiles at greater than conventional velocities will
impact targets. Hypervelocity targets will result in more
realistic testing. Other target characteristics that may
8Ibid., p. A-166.
70 Ibid., p. A-163.
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improve are effective range, high fire rate, lower weight and
lower costs. Again, knowledge of these target and test object
performance characteristics will aid in assessing range safety
requirements.
17. High Energy Density Materials
This technology will produce major challenges for
range safety and provide enhanced capabilities for targets.
Advances in fuses, bombs, mines and weapon warheads will tax
the requirement for safe testing. New approaches will be
needed to consider the safety of increased detonation output.
Used as propellants, targets will be able to travel
greater distances at higher speeds. Improved realistic target
signatures may result from newly developed compositions.
18. Composite Materials
Composite Materials, which are key to low-observable,
stealth capabilities, will have a major impact on tracking.
Tracking low-observable targets and test objects will pose a
major challenge for T&E. As tracking technology deve-'ps, the
question then becomes how realistic the target signature is
and to what level the test object signature has been reduced.
The development of this technology will also affect range
safety. T1'e ability to insure the position of low-observable
targets and test objects is crucial to the range safety
mission.
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Structural analysis, which is included in
environmental testing, will also be affected by this
technology. Research into composite materials will supplement
the task of predicting fatigue, hardness, elasticity and other
structural qualities of these composites. Of particular
interest are the damaged strength and electromagnetic
absorption characteristics of these composites.
Target design will be able to use composites in
structural frames. Typical weight savings over metal designs
are 20 to 30 percent. 7 This weight reduction can be used to
increase range, payload, velocity, maneuverability or reduce
fuel consumption.
19. Superconductivity
This technology will reduce performance limitations
and power losses of electrical and electronic equipment.
Consequently, data recording and reduction, and communications
will be affected. Computers are essential in data storage,
retrieval, archiving, reduction and display. They will benefit
from more efficient energy storage and distribution devices.
Such future systems will offer greater immunity from brown
out, easier repairs (due to small size), and local control of
71 Ibid., p. A-205.
72 Ibid., p. A-213.
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available energy. Energy devices for communication systems
will likewise benefit in a similar manner.
20. Biotechnology Materials and Process
Sensing and data storage functions could be affected
by the development of this technology. The biosensor program
will develop automated sensors that will couple highly
specific biomolecules for chemical recognition. 74 This
capability could be used to test the lethality of new chemical
weapons. Other testing could determine the level of protection
provided from current chemical warfare safety gear.
Bioelectronics will focus on optical storage and
switching devices using biomolecules.75 This research will
enable the production of semiconductor devices with substrate
thicknesses less than 0.5 microns. 76 This thin film
manufacturing process will aid in lowering costs, and
increasing circuit density.
In sum, the CTP is considered to have a significant
impact on T&E. It is important for the T&E community to
consider the CTP as one avenue to procure and possibly advance
required technologies for future T&E. Thirteen out of 20
7Ibid., p. A-215.
74 Ibid., p. A-229.
75 Ibid., p. A-230.
76 Ibid.
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critical technologies are concluded to be capable of making
major contributions in 11 of the 13 T&E functional areas. All
other critical technologies could provide some contributions
through related research.
The next chapter will summarize these relationships.
In addition, conclusions and recommendations are cited on the
impact on planning and budgeting for T&E.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS
In this chapter the impact of the Critical Technologies
Plan (CTP) on Test and Evaluation (T&E) is summarized.
Recommendations are then provided, discussing the possible
actions the T&E community can employ to influence the CTP and
its processes.
A. CONCLUSIONS
The CTP is deemed to have a significant impact on T&E.
Thirteen out of 20 critical technologies are concluded to be
capable of making major contributions in 11 of the 13
functional areas of T&E. All of the critical technologies are
concluded to be capable of making some contributions to all of
the T&E functional activities.
Of the 20 critical technologies, Simulation and Modeling
and Parallel Processing are determined to have the greatest
impact on T&E.
Simulation and Modeling duplicates simulation and modeling
identified in the T&E collection functions. Development of new
computer languages and algorithms, particularly artificial
intelligence, will make complex simulation more realistic,
easier and more affordable. Future modeling efforts will be
used to help develop optically based targets, provide analyses
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in concealment and deception, and measure performance during
wargaming exercises.
In addition, the bulk of T&E data is derived from
simulation. Computational Fluid Dynamics is viewed as a
subset of simulation and modeling. It will make major
contributions in simulating dynamic fluid flow around rigid
bodies.
Development of Parallel Computer Architectures affects the
data processing, communications and simulation and modeling
functions. Parallel Computer Architectures offers at least an
order of magnitude improvement in computing speeds,
availability and dependability. Availability and dependability
capabilities permit access to large, multi-site databases.
Increased computing speeds will allow tracking and scoring of
multiple test objects from multiple sensors. Time consuming
calculations in complex simulations that are not possible
today will be feasible with parallel computing.
Semiconductor Materials and Microelectronic Circuits is
the most pervasive technology for T&E, making some
contributions in all functions. Along with this technology,
Software Producibility has its greatest impact on
communications and data processing functions.
Department of Defense, Critical Technologies Plan, March 15,
1990, p. A-59.
op. cit., Emil Eichblatt Jr. ed., p. 182.
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Progress in Weapon System Environment technology is viewed
as making major contributions to production and acceptance
testing. As a element of environmental testing, this
technology will produce the data required to model more
realistic tests.
Two technologies, Passive Sensors and Sensitive Radars,
are determined to be subsets of sensing functions in T&E.
Sensitive Radars is also perceived to make major contributions
in tracking operations. Composite Materials introduces
challenges in tracking low-observable, stealthy targets and
test objects.
Machine Intelligence will present challenges in data
security. Autonomous data collection and transmission of
sensitive data will require unique solutions to maintain
security.
Development of High Energy Density Material will produce
challenges for range safety operations. Increased performance
in both propellants and explosives will require unique
solutions to limited range areas.
Lastly, Photonics and Data Fusion are capable of making
major contributions in the areas of communications and data
reduction and display, respectively.
The main objective of the CTP is to identify, prioritize,
consolidate and focus critical technologies requirements and
milestones within DoD and DoE. The function of T&E is to
provide a technical management tool used to reduce risk
89
throughout the acquisition cycle. It is certainly possible for
these two objectives to support each other, to their mutual
benefit. T&E will gain required technologies for future tests
through the CTP process. Also, testers could anticipate future
weapon systems from the identified critical technologies. The
CTP and its processes may become more attentive to the
technology needs of the T&E community within DoD.
Because many T&E activities are performed by the Services
through the Major Range and Test Facility Base (MRTFB), there
exists a limited constituency to support a long term
investment strategy. This limitation restricts the resources
available to solicit funding or to broaden the CTP decision-
making process to include T&E requirements.
Also, future budgetary constraints will reduce the amount
of funding available. The Central Test and Evaluation
Investment Program is one attempt to provide new test
resources to improve the capabilities of the MRTFB. However,
the Pentagon's request of $186 million was cut this year to
$112 million, and the plan to spend $1.7 billion through 1997
was deemed unrealistic by lawmakers.9 It is the
responsibility of the T&E community to use every available
means to maintain the technologies needed to adequately test
future weapon systems.
79Jack Weible, "Congress Slashes $74 Million From New DoD
Testing Program," Defense News, November 19, 1990, p. 20.
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The CTP is one forum for the T&E communities' technology
and funding concerns. It is this author's opinion that the
Science and Technology Strategic and CTP planning processes
should include T&E technology interests. It is recommended
that personnel from the Deputy Director, Defense Research and
Engineering (Test and Evaluation) be placed on the working
group responsible for developing the CTP. This working group
recommends possible technologies as critical. Specifically,
the Directors of Test Facility Resources and Weapon System
Assessment may be of greatest assistance.
Additionally, the T&E community should actively
concentrate on using the CTP process not only as a method of
anticipating future weapons, but as a process to acquire and
advance T&E technologies. This is especially true for
technologies already identified in past CTPs. Simulation and
Modeling and Parallel Computer Architectures will have a major
impact on T&E. Therefore it is in these areas that the T&E
community should attempt to provide influence and guidance and
obtain funding.
Finally, it is recommended that T&E technology
requirements be incorporated into future CTPs. Test and
Evaluation planning documents and studies should be used as a
means of identifying possible critical technologies for future
CTPs. Some examples included in the Test Resource Master Plan
are:
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1. Existing telemetry systems will not support the need
for high-capacity data rates.
2. There exists no national capability to adequately
perform structural testing of large space structures.
3. There exists no hypersonic wind tunnel capable of
testing above Mach 5.
4. There are inadequate provisions for insuring against
unauthorized (hostile) collection of data during T&E.
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PUBLIC LAW 100-456, SECTION 823
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102 STAT. 2018 PUBLIC LAW 10-4,-SP T. 29, 1998
Arm and SEC CYRMCAL TUMOROLOGnI PLAN
anahia, (a) IN GV:. -L-(1) Chapter 139 of tite 10, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end the following new amction
01 :3U. Critical technologies plan
"(a) AmmUAu. PLA.-.-(1) Not later than March 15 of each year. the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. in consultation with the
Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Prraums, shall submit to
the Committee on Armed Servicm of the Senate and the House of
Representatives a plan for developing the 20 technologies considered
by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy to be the
technologies most essential to develop in order to ensure the long.
term qualitative superiority of United States weapon systems.
"t2) In selecting the technolo ies to be included in the plan. the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy shall consider
both product technologies and proe technologies.
"(3) Such plan shall be submitUd in both clasified and uncLassi.
fled form.
"(b) Cowrzr or L..-Each plan submitted under subecion (a)
shall include, with respec to each technology included in the plan.
the following matters:
"(1) The rusons for selecting such technology.
"(2) The milestone goals for the devalopment of such
technology.
"(3) The amounts contained in the budgets of the Department
of Defense, the Department of Energy, and other departments
and agencies for the support of the development of such tech.
nology for the faical year beginning in the year in which thepIan is submitted.
"(4) A comparison of the poitions of the United States and
the Soviet Union in the development of such technology.
"(5) The potential contributions that the allies of the United
States can make to meet the needs of the alliance for such
technology.
"(6) With respect to the development of such technology. a
comparison of the relative positions of the United States and
other industrialized countries that are prominent in the devel-
opment of such technology and the extent to which the United
States should depend on other countries for the development of
such technology.
"(7) The potential contributions that the private sector can be
expected to make from its own remour in connection with
development of civilian applications for such technology.".(2) The table of sctions at the beginning of such chapter is
amended by adding at the end the following new item:
"M CUk ~AIMM90010 pli.
PUBLIC LAW 100-456-SEPT. 29, 198E 102 STAT. 2019
(b) Frms Ruourr.-The first report under nation 2368 of title 10, 10 USC 236C




PUBLIC LAW 101-189, SECTION 605
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EXCERPTS FROM NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 1990 AND 1991:
ANNUAL DEFENSE CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES PLAN
(PL 101-189)
103 STAT. 1512 PUBLIC LAW 101-189-NOV. 29, 1989
(b) A xKNUAL Duxiem CamcAL Tsc o2eoLmu PL.i.-(1) Chapter
148 of title 10, United State Code, ia mended by dn at tbe end
the following new section:
1 2506. Annual defense critical technologies plan
"(a) AmI'U,. PL".--1) The Secretary of Defense shmal submit to
the Committees on Armed Service of the Senate and House of
Representatives an annual plan for developing the technologies
condered by the Secretary of Defense and the Secetary of Energ
to be the techologies most critica to saing the long-term quai.-
tative superiority of United States wampon syvtme. The number of
such technologie identified in any plan may not emeed 20. Each
such plan h be developed in consultation with the Secretary of
Energy.
"(2) In selecting the technolorim to be included in the plan for any
year, the Secretary of Defense and the Secrtary of Energy sll
conmder both product technologies and prom. technologies, includ.
the technologies identified in the most i cant biennial report
mitted to thp. Preident by the National Critical Technologies
Panel under title VI of the National Science and Technology Policy,
Oqranition, and Priorities Act of 1976.
(3) Each such plan shal cover the 15 fsal year foowing the
in which the plan is submitted.
"(4) Such plan ahaU be submitted not later than March 15 of each
y and shall be submitted in both climifed and unclamified form.
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PUBLIC LAW 101-189-NOV. 29, 1989 103 STAT. 1513
"(b) Pwzoarz Am i uwrnn.-Ech plan submitted under
subection (0 shall-
"(D designat priorities for development of the technologies
identified in the plan; and
"(2) specify the funding requirements of the Department of
Defense the Depaent of Energy, and other appropriate
departments and agencies of the Federal Government for the
development of the technologies identified in the plan for
the five fiscal years following the year in which the plan is
submitted.
"(c) Coimr , or PL&N.-Each plan submitted under subsection (a)
@hall include, with remet to each technology identified in the plan.
thef") e reasons for the selection of that technology, includ-
TM(A) a discumion of the consideration given to the most
recent biennial report submitted to the President under
title VI of the National Science and Technology Polcy,
Omj)ition. and Priorities Act of 1976; and
(B) the relationship of the technology to the overall
science and technology program of the Department of Do.
fense and the long.term funding strategy associated with
that program.
"(2) A designation of the lead organization within the Depart-
ment of Defense or the Department of Energy reponsible for
the development of the technology.
"(3) A summary description of the lead organization's plan for
the development 'of the technology, including the milestone
"(4) The amounts contained in the budgets of the Department
of Defense. the Department of Energy, and other departments
and agencies for the support of the development of such tech-
nology for-
"(A) the five preceding fiscal year, and
"MB) the fiscal year beginning in the year in which the
plan is submitted; and
"(C) each fiscal year thereafter for which the Secretary of
Defense, with .- pect to the Department of Defense, and
the Secretary of Energy, with respect to the Department of
Energy, has prepared a budget.
"(5) A comparison of the positions of the United States and
the Soviet Union in the development of that technology.
"(6) The potential contributions that the allie of the United
States and other industrialized nations can make to meet the
needs of the United States and its allies for that technology.
"(7) A comparison of the extent to which the United States
has accs to research conducted on such technology in alied
nations and other industrialized nations with the extent to
which such nations have aem to research conducted in the
United States on such technology and a discumion of the effects
of any imbelance in such access on development of that tech.
nol.i.o '
"(8) With respect to the development of such technology-
"A) a comparison of the relative positions of the United
States and other industrialized countries that are promi-
nent in the development of such technology,
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103 STAT. 1514 PUBLIC LAW 101-189-NOV. 29, 1989
") the trends in the relevant indus-ia base of such
countries;
"(C) the competitiveness of the United States industrial
bose EPPortiJf research in. and the development and use
of, such technologn
"(D) the extent to which the United States should depend
on other ountrie for the development of such technologr'
and
"() the extent to which action shoud be taken by the
Federal Government to maintain and i=prove-
'(i) reearch efforts in the United States; and
"(ii) the industrial base supporting such efforta.
"(9) The potential contributions that the private sector can be
expected to make from its own resource in connection with the
development of civilian applications for such technolog.'.(2) The table of sections at the berning of such chapter is
amended by adding at the end the following new item:
-AN6. Annual *uom aiba tchwoIkas plja".
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To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1991 for military activities of the
Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of
the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for mucb fiscal
years for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
JULY 20 (legislative day, JuLT 10), 1990
Mr. NumN, from the Committee on Armed Services, reported the following
original bill; which was read twice and placed on the calendar
A BILL
To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1991 for military
activities of the Department of Defense, for military con-
struction, and for defense activities of the Department of
Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal
years for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.
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6 TITLE VIII-ACQUISITION POLICY AND
7 MANAGEMENT
8 PART A-DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOOT BASE
9 SEC. 801. ANNUAL DEFENSE CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES PLAN
10 (a) INCREASED INFORMATION R LATING TO FUND-
11 rNG.-Section 2508(b) of title 10, United States Code, is
12 amended-
13 (1) by striking out "and" at the end of paragraph
14 (1);
15 (2) by striking out the period at the end of para-
16 graph (2) and inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon; and
17 (3) by inserting at the end the following new
18 paragraphs:
19 "(3) identify each program element (contained in
20 the budget information submitted to Congress by the
21 Department of Defense in support of the budget sub-
22 mitted by the President pursuant to section 1105(a) of
23 title 81 for the first fiscal year covered by the plan) for
24 which funds are budgeted for the support of the devel-





1 "(4) for each such program element-
2 "(A) specify the amount included for each
3 critical technology covered by the program ele-
4 ment; and
5 "(B) include a comparison of that amount
6 with the amount, if any, available to the Depart-
7 ment of Defense for development of such critical
8 technology for the fiscal year preceding the first
9 fiscal year covered by the plan.".
10 (b) APPLICABILTY.-The amendments made by sub-
11 section (a) shall apply to annual defense critical technologies
12 plans submitted after March 1, 1991.
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APPENDIX D
SUMMARY OF CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES
This appendix is provided to describe, in more detail, the
critical technologies identified in the 1989 and 1990 CTPs. A
more in-depth explanation of each technology can be found in
the original CTPs which are identified in the bibliography.
A. 1989 CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES
The twenty-two technologies identified in the 1989 CTP are
summarized below. This summary includes an overview
description, total S&T funding (best available estimate),
impact on weapons systems and comparisons with other
countries. The funding figures are taken directly from the
CTPs and as mentioned in those plans, are generally not
precise budgetary quantities.
The first seven or eight of these technologies are very
closely related to one another and, in fact, are part of what
could be considered the revolution in our capability -f
information processing and handling. so
sSenator Jeff Bingaman, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed
Services, United States Senate, Part 7, Defense Industry and
Technology, March 17, 1989, p. 15.
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1. Microelectronic Circuits and Their Fabrication
Microelectronic circuits is a process technology that
will lead to better production of ultra-small integrated
electronic devices for high speed computers, sensitive
receivers and automatic controllers. The emphasis is on
developing more reliable methods to produce silicon for
microelectronic circuits. Total S&T funding for this critical
technology in FY 1990 is on the order of $200 million.
This technology will provide integrated circuits that
will be less susceptible to interference in weapons systems
and more resistant to damage from either natural or man-made
radiation. Miniaturization techniques allow for major
modifications on current weapons platforms, new weapons
concepts and ability to build in self-test circuitry.
Japan is considered the leader in most aspects of
microelectronics manufacturing with the exception of
microprocessors and application specific integrated
circuits. The NATO allies, individually, do not presently
rival either the US or Japan. However this could change,
because the European countries have extensive capabilities in
a number of important supporting technologies. The US
microelectronics industry leads all communist countries. The
81 Department of Defense, Critical Technologies Plan, Revised,
May 5, 1989, p. A-9.
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Warsaw Pact nations are severely limited in their ability to
close the microelectronic technology gap.
2. Preparation of Gallium Arsenide (GaAs) and Other
Compound Semi-Conductors
This technology is concerned with the manufacture and
preparation of high purity gallium arsenide (GaAs) and other
semiconductors. These new semiconductors will be used in
integrated circuits. The major advantage of GaAs is the
increased electron drift velocity. Total S&T funding for this
critical technology in FY 1990 is on the order of $100
million.
Using GaAs will result in signal and data processing
which is about seven times faster than that which is
achievable with silicon. In addition to increased speed,
the integrated electronic circuits will be more resistant to
radiation. This radiation hardening enables them to survive
better in the battlefield and space environments. Use of GaAs
will affect circuits in electronic warfare, radar, smart
weapons and communication systems.
Japan is the leader in GaAs materials technology and
could clearly make contributions to US capabilities.8
European research and design is significant and growing but is
8 Ibid., p. A-I.
3Ibid., p. A-13.
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not as extensive as either the US or Japan. 8 Soviet work is
believed to remain behind advances in the US by approximately
eight years.85
3. Software Producibility
Software producibility refers to the objective of
producing reliable, affordable, and secure software in a
timely fashion. This includes the goal of producing software
that is reusable. Total S&T funding for this critical
technology in FY 1990 is on the order of $70 million.
Software is a key element in virtually all major
weapon systems. Costs of development and maintenance of
software are a large portion of the overall costs. Advances in
software technology will yield important capability
improvements such as -high reliability for secure and life-
critical systems, rapid adaptability for systems in a changing
environment, reliable and secure large-scale distributed
computation for command, control, and communications (C3 )
applications, and access to the performance potential
available in low-cost highly parallel hardware.8
A perceived Japanese lead in supercomputing is
somewhat offset by a US lead in serial production and
applications of lower-cost machines with parallel processing
Ibid.
85 Ibid., p. A-14.
6Ibid., p. A-15.
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architectures.87 The NATO countries have strong capabilities
in selected areas of computer technologies. However no single
country has proficiency in as many areas as the US. The Soviet
Union has shown some good theoretical work in computer
science, but software is an area of deficiency because of the
shortage of computers.
4. Parallel Computer Architectures
Parallel computer architectures greatly increase the
speed at which computers currently operate. Generally it is
believed that parallel architectures will increase computing
speed by 1000 times while reducing costs by ten times.a
Total S&T funding for this critical technology in FY 1990 is
on the order of $80 million.
This technology supports the computational capability
needed for computational fluid efynamics done for hypersonic
flight, anti-submarine warfare and automatic target
recognition. Computer systems are expected to continue to
provide a critical edge coming from superior performance of
weapons and command/control systems which serve as a force
multiplier.
The US has a significant worldwide lead in serial
production and practical application of parallel processing
87 Ibid., p. A-17.
8Ibid., p. A-21.
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hardware. 89 Japan, the UK, the Netherlands and Germany all
have credible efforts in advanced computing. The Japanese are
a few years behind the US in highly parallel systems,
particularly in systems software, but can be expected to close
that gap. The UK was a primary contributor in the
development of a programing language for parallel computers
and the Netherlands has become more active in the area of
algorithms.91 There is no evidence that the Eastern Bloc has
any success in high-performance computing. The Soviets are,
and will continue to be, severely hampered by the lack of
micro-circuits; therefore their capabilities will be limited
to theory, research and small prototyping.
5. Machine Intelligence/Robotics
Machine intelligence and robotics is an attempt to
apply artificial intelligence and expert systems to defense
applications. This is primarily a integration process to build
robotics and machines that can help with battlefield
management. Total S&T funding for this critical technology in
FY 1990 is on the order of $70 million.
The faced paced battlefield of the future will include
many sensors and weapons identifying targets. Intelligent
systems will be used to integrate, process and analyze this
89 Ibid., p. A-23.
Ibid.
91 Ibid., p. A-23.
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data. These systems will enhance military intelligence, timely
decision making, replanning and survivability. The use of
unmanned air vehicles and robotic vehicles will reduce the
number of operators on the battlefield. Additionally,
application of robotics and intelligent machines to the
manufacturing process will lead to flexible manufacturing and
reduce set-up and lead times.
The US has had a commanding lead in the computing
capabilities needed for this technology, but that lead is
being diminished. Japan and, to a lesser extent some of the
European allies have made significant advances in the
industrial application of such technology. The Soviet Bloc
significantly lacks in machine intelligence and robotics,
although they have a good theoretical understanding and
creativeness in applying the technology.92
6. Simulation and Modeling
Simulation and modeling involves testing concepts and
designs without building physical replicas. This technology
will encompass both hardware and analytical simulations.
Hardware simulations have been produced in the past for
aircraft development. Realistic simulations are now very close
to the hardware and missions pilots have to perform. The
analytical simulations are models that would greatly influence
92 Ibid., p. A-29.
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training. Total S&T funding for this critical technology in FY
1990 is on the order of $115 million.
Simulation and modeling can be applied to every major
weapon system development program. Design and production costs
will decrease while improving performance and maintenance.
Training costs will decrease by providing operators with
realistic simulations. Also there will be enhanced
capabilities in war gaming and teaching commanders how to use
the information provided to them.
Generally, Japan lags the US in its development of
databases that are required to do effective military
modeling. NATO allies are advancing computer modeling and
simulation technology, but most lack the high-speed scientific
computers needed. The-Soviet Union lags the US in large-scale
computers and graphic workstations. However they extensively
use simulation and modeling for war-gaming and weapons
development. Their knowledge base may equal or lead the US
in these specific areas.
7. Integrated Optics
Integrated optics, also known as optronics or
photonics is the marriage of optical and electronic processes
and capabilities. Increased capabilities will be realized in
both storage memories and in data processing. If this
9Ibid., p. A-34.
94 Ibid., p. A-35.
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technology is successful, processing speeds will be
approximately one hundred times faster than today.95 Storage
discs will also increase their capacity for information. Total
S&T funding for this critical technology in FY 1990 is on the
order of $25 million.
Enhanced processing is important on the battlefield
for real-time display of information and to update this
rapidly changing information. Expanded memories will give
individual commanders more information than in the past. For
example, the commander would be able to retrieve detailed maps
either instantaneously or within seconds.
The US and Japan share a worldwide lead in this
technology. The NATO allies have significant efforts that, if
combined together, have the potential to compete with the US
or Japan. The Warsaw Pact is lacking key aspects of the
technology, particularly in materials and manufacturing
techniques and optical interconnection techniques.
8. Fiber Optics
Fiber optics' primary purpose is to transfer
information, rather than its production or storage.
Information will be able to be transmitted at ten times the
capacity of present channels at one-tenth the error rate.97
95Ibid., p. A-37.
% Ibid., p. A-40.
97 op. cit., Senator Jeff Bingaman, p. 19.
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This will raise the quality and quantity of information
available to the battlefield. Total S&T funding for this
critical technology in FY 1990 is on the order of $20 million.
This technology will be useful in submarine detection
and will have its primary impact in the surveillance and
communications fields. Fiber optic communication links will
add a whole new range of capabilities for weapon guidance
since they provide for wideband, non-line-of-sight, two way
communication.98 Another application integrates fiber optics
with gyros. Fiber gyros are more accurate, smaller, all solid
state, more rugged and more reliable.
The US and Japan share a worldwide lead in this
technology. Japan clearly leads the world in converting
research and design in fiber optic technologies into various
commercial applications and has manufactured low-loss optical
fibers. NATO countries have shown some production of low-
loss optical fibers but may have difficulty in producing such
fibers in large quantities.1 The Warsaw Pact is seen as
lagging in all important aspects of this technology including;
production, components and interconnections.
98 op. cit., Department of Defense, p. A-44.
"Ibid., p. A-46.
100 Ibid., p. A-47.
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9. Sensitive Radars
Sensitive radars are a mature but very important
technology. The objective is to produce radar sensors capable
of detecting low-observable targets and/or capable of
classification, recognition and identification of
uncooperative targets. This could be laser technology as well
as microwave technology. Total S&T funding for this critical
technology in FY 1990 is on the order of $130 million.
Non-cooperative targets challenge radar technology not
only in low observable detection. Classification, (aircraft,
missile, tanker, etc.) recognition, (friend, foe, armed,
unarmed) and identification (time and placement) information
are needed to select an appropriate action. This technology
will counter the emerging stealth threat while improving
electronic counter-counter measure capabilities and operation
in high-clutter environments.10 1 In addition, it will aid in
long-range detection of mobile military targets under all
weather conditions and reliable detection of concealed or
camouflaged military targets.
Both Japan and NATO countries are believed to be able
to make some contributions to this technology. France and
Germany are actively pursuing joint investigation in the use
of laser radar technology for helicopter detection and
101 Ibid., p. A-50.
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recognition. Both France and Norway are studying the use
of imaging techniques against surface targets. Outside of
NATO, Sweden seems to have a significant effort covering
topics relating to non-cooperative target recognition.103
10. Passive Sensors
Development of weapons against radars is fairly
sophisticated. Therefore, the advancement of passive sensors
has been identified as critical. Passive sensors would supply
information that is usually supplied by radars. These sensors
do not emit signals to detect targets, monitor the
environment, or determine the status or condition of
equipment. Sensor methods include infrared, visible,
ultraviolet, X-rays and microwave radiation. Total S&T funding
for this critical technology in FY 1990 is on the order of $90
million.
Passive sensing will be used to complement the effort
to counter stealth threats. Sensors will improve battlefield
capabilities, improve target acquisition performance and
improve sensitivity in adverse weather. Other uses included
long-range search, target acquisition, tracking for fleet air
defense, high altitude unmanned air vehicles, ship defense and
aircraft target detection.
102 Ibid., p. A-53.
103 Ibid.
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In general, the US is ahead of our allies in all
respects of passive sensing technology. Principal
cooperative opportunities will exist with NATO countries. This
includes Germany, which is already producing a US modular
infrared detector under US license, and with the UK.
105
Japan's solid-state technology, in the area of dissimilar
compound semiconductor materials, could clearly make
contributions. Eastern Bloc countries are believed to have
developed a infrared detector. However, there is little
evidence of mass production and deployment.'0
11. Automatic Target Recognition
Automatic target recognition is an application based
technology. It is a combination of computer architecture,
algorithms, and signal processing for near real-time
detection, identification and tracking of targets. Total S&T
funding for this critical technology in FY 1990 is on the
order of $75 million.
This application is essential in very smart weapons
which can be self-guided to the target. It will assist
operators of tanks and aircraft to identify targets and to aim
the weapons at the target. Opportunities also exist in
undersea targeting, over-the-horizon targeting, airborne
104 Ibid., p. A-59.
105 Ibid., p. A-59.
106 Ibid., p. A-61.
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multiple target fire control, anti-ship and other air-to-
surface missiles. 107
The US enjoys a significant lead over other countries
in the area of automatic target recognition, and the
development and use of the large databases needed to support
this effort.1' Work going on in NATO could contribute to the
advancement of smart sensors and algorithms applicable to
automatic target recognition.
12. Phased Arrays
There are three types of phased arrays - radars,
acoustic and optical. Phased arrays form spatial beams by
controlling the phase or amplitude of signals of many small
individual radiating elements. By correctly shifting the
inputs of the individual radiators, the radar beam can be
steered through a very large angle without mechanical motion.
This is essentially a signal processing technology which
includes system architecture, processing algorithms, and
hardware components. Total S&T funding for this critical
technology in FY 1990 is on the order of $80 million.
This technolcqy could be used to eliminate antennas on
aircraft or other platforms by enabling the skii itself to
become the antenna. This greatly reduces drag and
identification possibilities. Also, the requirement for
107 Ibid., p. A-64.
108 Ibid., p. A-67.
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cooling decreases because the energy output is distributed
over a ldrger area. This improvement in cooling efficiency
increases reliability.
The US has established a significant lead over other
nations, specifically in the development of air and ship based
phased-array radar. Related work is being performed by many
NATO countries and Japan. Significant contributions may be
made in the application of GaAs to active arrays.
13. Data Fusion
Data fusion is taking information from many sensors in
many different forms, integrating it and making it presentable
to a human operator. For example, the commander or pilot has
to have information presented so that they can interpret it
quickly and use it essentially in real-time. Total S&T funding
for this critical technology in FY 1990 is on the order of $90
million.
This battlefield management technology will have an
application to smart weapons, self-guided cluster weapons and
to large area surveillance systems. It will assist commanders
by providing wide area surveillance from space and sea,
predicting environmental conditions and managing assets. It
will also assist platform operators such as pilots in future
cockpits and navigation.
Principal cooperative opportunities lie with NATO
countries in the areas of modeling, algorithms, and data
117
links. Access to Japan's technology in electronics and faster
data links would make significant contributions. The Warsaw
Pact is seen as lagging in faster data links and, in general,
lagging in all but some aspects of data fusion.
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14. Signature Control
Signature control is the ability to control target
signatures. These signatures include radar, optical, acoustic,
or other detectable characteristics. The reduction of vehicle
signatures increases survivability. This technology includes
stealth capabilities. This effort is a way of not only
increasing the camouflage, concealment and deception of
platforms and weapon systems, but also to counter them.
Funding for this critical technology comes mostly from outside
the S&T program.
The use of signature reduction technology for
strategic systems can render the Soviet Union's early warning
system ineffective, allowing penetration without losses. 
110
In tactical systems such as fighter and attack aircraft,
increases in effectiveness based on the use of stealth
technology are possible.
Discussion of a comparison with other countries for
this technology is not possible due to its sensitivity.
109 Ibid., p. A-78.
110 Ibid., p. A-81.
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15. Computational Fluid Dynamics
Computational fluid dynamics is the modeling and
simulation of complex fluid flow. This technology will have
the capability of solving fluid flow equations in three
dimensions. Wind tunnel facilities and other hardware
experiments will be replaced by computer models and
simulations. This technology is primarily under development by
a joint DoD and NASA effort for the national aerospace plane.
Total S&T funding for this critical technology in FY 1990 is
on the order of $30 million.
Computational fluid dynamics will lower design risks
and lower costs of future flight vehicles, while enabling
testing of hypersonic vehicles. The technology can be applied
to aircraft, missiles, projectiles, re-entry vehicles, and
ocean vehicles. The first application will be trying to model
the hypersonic flow above Mach eight, the current limit of
wind tunnel testing. il If the decision is made to build the
national aerospace plane (X-30), simulation will be needed at
orbital speed - Mach twenty. This technology can reduce drag
in both air and sea vessels resulting in higher speeds,
increased ranges with smaller engines, and use of less fuel.
The US possesses the key elements at a high level of
sophistication to maintain a lead in the area of computational
fluid dynamics. Japan's supercomputing software expertise
Ibid., p. A-83.
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could help the effort in this technology. NATO countries
could provide assistance in the are of algorithm developments.
The Soviet Bloc and other adversaries are believed to be
behind the US in this technology and are unlikely to close the
gap because of US superiority in computers, software, and
materials. 112
16. Air Breathing Propulsion
Air breathing propulsion is a mature technology that
has experienced steady, slow improvements. The objective is to
produce dramatic improvements in light-weight, fuel efficient
engines using oxygen to support combustion. Total S&T and NASA
funding for this critical technology in FY 1990 is on the
order of $116 million and $35 million respectively.
The obvious application is in maintaining air
superiority of our current aircraft. This superiority will be
seen in increased range, time aloft, and payload. These
increases can and will also be perceived in rotorcraft and
commercial and transport aircraft. Additionally, cruise
missile will realize payoffs of lower costs, high Mach
capability and increased range.
The two key aspects of this technology that indicate
significant capabilities are development, and application of
light-weight/high-temperature/high-strength materials and
modeling and simulation of aerodynamic flow. Both NATO
112 Ibid., p. A-88.
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countries and Japan are believed to be capable of making major
contributions in the area of material development, with only
some contributions in modeling and simulation.113 The Warsaw
Pact is generally lagging in modeling and simulation and
materials developments.
17. High Powered Microwaves
High powered microwaves are being developed jointly by
the DoE and DoD. High powered microwaves produce radiation
similar to those produced by nuclear weapons. Since some of
our systems are susceptible to such damage, the interest is to
determine the survivability of our weapon systems. The other
interest is to see if this technology can be applied to
systems the enemy may field. Total S&T funding for this
critical technology in FY 1990 is on the order of $50 million.
High power microwaves offer a means of defeating the
enemy systems in mass by disrupting the ever increasing use of
microelectronics and electrical subsystems. It may also play
a role in interrupting communications without resorting to
nuclear weapons. Also, there is a complementary need to
113 Ibid., p. A-93.
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protect sensitive friendly electronic circuits in dense
electromagnetic environments, such as on board ships.
The Warsaw Pact is seen to have significant leads in
the development of components needed for this technology, but
is lacking in power handling and control of microwave
beams.It4 NATO countries and Japan are considered capable of
making some contributions in both development of components
and power handling and control.
18. Pulsed Power
Pulsed power is a technology which addresses the
problem of generating power in the field with relatively low-
weight and low-volume devices. It is specifically aimed at
directed energy weapons, anti-armor, high powered microwave
weapons and electromatic guns. The main thrust is to improve
energy storage capability by an order of magnitude or more.
Total S&T funding for this critical technology in FY 1990 is
on the order of $65 million.
The use of electromagnetic guns will permit an
extended range of anti-armor weapons, close air support (such
as the A-10), and surface ship missile systems. Ground-based
directed energy weapons can also be used in many different
warfighting scenarios. High powered miirowaves can upset smart
electronic systems rendering missiles and smart mines
ineffective.
11 Ibid., p. A-97.
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The US is the world leader in the development of
compact, lightweight power systems. Recent breakthroughs in US
capacitor fabrication which increase energy storage densities,
have established a significant US lead in this area.115
However, the Soviet Union has an extensive program in pulse
power and may lead in a number of other areas. NATO and Japan
have demonstrated competence in specific areas of switching
and Japan has developed primary power sources that may prove
adaptable to pulse power.116
19. Hypervelocity Projectiles
Hypervelocity projectiles is more of a application
technology. The purpose is to provide the capability to shoot
projectiles at greater than conventional velocities (over 1.6
km/sec). 11  This technology also investigates the unique
behavior of projectiles and targets at such velocities. Total
S&T funding for this critical technology in FY 1990 is on the
order of $100 million.
This technology is important for electromatic guns and
the ability to defeat advanced armors on the battlefield.
Hypervelocity projectiles generate more destructive capability
against simple, composite, and active armors. This increase in
destructive capability per projectile also offers a potential
115 Ibid., p. A-101.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid., p. A-103.
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reduction in system weight. Increasing the effective range is
another advantage of hypervelocity projectiles.
The US is the leader in this technology in all
critical aspects. Soviet technology differs in that their
projectiles are employed at much greater velocities. The
Soviets may have a technological lead over the US in





This technology is a process technology involving
materials possessing high-strength and low-weight with the
ability to withstand high temperatures. The essential problem
is to manufacture advanced materials in a reliable,
reproducible, low cost process. This includes the development
and production of polymeric composites, metal-matrix and
ceramic-matrix composites, and carbon-carbon based materials
or coatings.119  Total S&T funding for this critical
technology in FY 1990 is on the order of $110 million.
This technology is required for many vehicle
structures, such as high-temperature propulsion systems,
hypervelocity vehicles, vertical take-off and landing
vehicles, as well as for spacecraft, advanced hull designs and
118 Ibid., p. A-106.
119 Ibid., p. A-107.
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submarine structures. Advanced materials offer substantial
improvements in performance and reductions in cost. Weight
savings of approximately 25 to 50 percent can be achieved in
ground and air vehicles.120 The use of adhesives can effect
a 10 percent weight reduction in helicopters. 121 High-
temperature composite materials can increase engine thrust by
more than 50 percent and reduce fuel consumption by as much as
40 percent.12 New processing techniques can also bring the
cost of armor ceramics down to usable levels.
Both NATO and Japan have active materials development
programs and may lead in selected aspects of material
research. The US has an overall lead in the design and
effective use of advanced materials in military applications.
The Soviet Union is second only to the US and Japan in
materials and structures research and design. Therefore, the
US no longer has the strong lead it previously enjoyed. The
Soviet Union's large scale research and design effort,
abundant natural resources, extensive capital investment, and
support from the Warsaw Pact Allies all contribute to the
decline of the leads the US had possessed.123
12 Ibid., p. A-108.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid., p. A-ill.
125
21. Superconductivity
Superconductivity has been termed an enabling
technology, one that is emerging from science but has not yet
been applied. This technology is concerned with the
fabrication and exploitation of superconducting materials. It
is focused on understanding the physics of high and low
temperature superconductivity and developing materials which
will inczease its applications. Total S&T funding for this
critical technology in FY 1990 is on the order of $100
million.
Future applications include electric drive systems for
ships (and possibly land vehicles and aircraft), generators,
energy storage for directed energy weapons, electromagnetic
shields, supermagnets, communications and surveillance systems
and very high speed computers. 12 Many of these systems
cannot be achieved with conventional electronics technology,
while others will offer new capabilities to platforms that are
currently incapable of supporting semiconductor counterparts.
The US and Japan share a worldwide lead in this
technology. Japanese technology enjoys a significant lead in
digital superconducting devices and electronics.I1 5 NATO
research generally lags the US and Japan has traditionally
124 Ibid., p. A-113.
125 Ibid., p. A-115.
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been strong in basic research, but has trailed in applications
except in narrow areas such as magnets and cables.
22. Biotechnology Materials and Processing
Lastly, biotechnology is, again, an enabling
technology. It is the systematic application of biology for an
end use in military engineering or medicine. It is now
possible to genetically engineer plant and animal cells for
high yield rates and efficiencies. This technology has the
potential for resolution of operational and logistical
problems in both medical and non-medical arenas. Total S&T
funding for this critical technology in FY 1990 is on the
order of $100 million.
Medical applications include developing vaccines to
protect troops, sensors to warn of chemical or biological
attack, response to those attacks, artificial blood, and rapid
wound healing promoters. In the non-medical arena this
technology will lead to the development of bacteria to reduce
environmental hazards from toxic wastes, specialty lubricants,
high-strength polymers and composites, protective gear,
biosensors, and bioprocessing memories.
Because of the importance of biotechnology in health
and agriculture sectors, there is a universal interest and
activity in the field. Many European countries are active in
the area and they are likely to continue developing this field
rapidly. The Soviet Union has an extensive program in
127
biotechnology research which is concentrated in a relatively
small number of research and design centers.126 Since much of
the research in this field is published in open literature,
the USSR has not faced restrictions in accessing scientific
knowledge. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact countries have been able
to readily acquire western biotechnology organisms and
products.
B. 1990 CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES
The two new technologies identified in the 1990 CTP are
summarized below. This summary includes an overview
description, impact on weapons systems and comparisons with
other countries. In addition, updated funding profiles are
given for the remaining technologies.
1. Weapon System Environment
Weapon system environment technology differs from
other critical technologies because it does not develop
specific hardware. Weapon systems are increasingly influenced
by environmental effects (weather, seasons, terrain) due to
their increasing sensitivity. To increase system capabilities
these environmental factors must be clearly understood.
Application of environmental conditions through logic
modules, design and testing will reduce the false alarms on
current smart weapons. Knowledge of electromagnetic
126 Ibid., p. A-123.
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fluctuations in the ionosphere will enhance over-the-horizon
radar capable of detecting low-observable targets.127
Minehunting, magnetic submarine sensors, and communications
performance are also affected by ionospheric disturbances.
Enhanced weather predictions will aid in choosing tactical
weapons. Knowledge of environmental effects will enable
designers to optimize imaging and detection systems.
Because of international cooperation in weather
prediction and oceanography, there is a high level of activity
and capability in this technology. The Soviet Union is most
capable in the weapon-target environment and the theoretical
aspects of underwater acoustics.128 The US and its NATO
partners lead in the employment of environmental products
because of a lead in computers and related software and
hardware.
2. High Energy Density Materials
High energy density materials are ccmposites of
ingredients used as explosives, propellants or pyrotechnics.
They either propel the ordnance to the target and/or kill the
target by fragments or blast. All three Services use these
materials in both strategic and tactical weapon systems.
127 Department of Defense, Critical Technologies Plan, March
15, 1990, p. A-120.
128 Ibid., p. A-127.
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High energy density material can increase performance
of weapon systems by increasing range and penetration. Other
areas of improvements will be seen in a reduction of potential
hazards, signature reduction, availability, dependability and
reliability.
The US has the lead in the development of certain
explosives. However, countries such as France can match US
capabilities while incorporating these materials into weapons
quickly.129 Besides France and the UK, most other countries
are not believed to be pursuing the development of higher
energy density material beyond current production. The Soviet
Union has an extremely large R&D program for the development
of this technology. Because the Soviets have made investments
in areas that do not compare with the West, they are more
advanced in these areas.
3. Funding Profiles
Funding is derived from programs in the DoD budget.
Because most programs involve several technologies, it becomes
a matter of judgement how many dollars to count toward which
technology. All figures reported are in millions of dollars.
Fiscal Year
GROUP A 86-90 91 92 93 94 95 96
1. Composite Materials 670 170 180 180 180 180 170
129 Ibid., p. A-198.
130 Itid., p. A-200.
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2. Computational Fluid
Dynamics 420 80 80 90 90 90 90
3. Data Fusion 210 50 50 50 50 50 50
4. Passive Sensors 1,900 460 420 420 430 440 440
5. Photonics 560 100 110 110 15 120 120
6. Semiconductor
Materials
and Microelectronics 2,100 450 460 480 480 480 480
27. Signal Processing 580 130 130 140 140 140 140
8. Software
Producibility 420 130 140 150 150 150 150
GROUP B
9. Air-Breathing
Propulsion 720 180 210 210 210 210 210
10. Machine Intelligence
and Robotics 540 120 100 100 100 100 100
11. Parallel Computer
Architectures 250 120 140 150 150 150 150
12. Sensitive Radars 880 110 130 140 150 150 150
13. Signature Control No Data Available
14. Simulation and
Modeling 810 210 250 230 230 230 230
15. Weapon System





and Processes 451 100 100 100 105 110 115
17. High-Energy Density
Materials 370 90 100 100 100 100 100
18. Hypervelocity
Projectiles 460 120 130 130 130 130 130
19. Pulsed Power 640 160 150 160 160 170 170
20. Superconductivity 300 95 110 140 145 150 160
132
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